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The 30th annual joint meeting of The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP) with
The Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science (SSIPS)
Abstracts
Karl Aho, Baylor University,
karl_aho@baylor.edu
“Philosophy as Training for Death: The reflexivity of Socratic exhortation in the Phaedo”
After telling his companions what he has heard about the afterlife, Socrates says “a man should repeat
this to himself as if it were an incantation, which is why I have been prolonging my tale.” (Phaedo 114d).
In this passage, Socrates does not merely advise his companions to tell stories—he includes himself, a
man, within the scope of this claim. So Socrates reaches his famously positive view of the afterlife (at
least in part) through his practice of telling stories about the afterlife. In other words, since Socrates tells
us that philosophy is training for death (Phaedo 67e), we should view the philosophizing that Socrates
does in the Phaedo as his own preparation for death. In this paper, I argue that we should view
Socrates’ claims about philosophy as training for death as reflexive, i.e. applying to himself in addition to
his interlocutors. Socrates is not a fully-prepared philosopher instructing his followers. Instead, he is
trying to prepare himself for death through exhorting his companions to prepare themselves. Some
readers of Plato might find this view shocking, particularly given the standard view that Socrates is
Plato’s moral exemplar and the paradigmatic figure of the wise philosopher.
To defend my thesis, I will first argue—against the standard reading of the Phaedo—that Plato’s
character Socrates needs to prepare for death. Second, I will show how Socrates prepares himself for
death by discussing Socrates’s conversation and storytelling in the dialogue as a spiritual exercise—of the
sort discussed by Pierre Hadot—that helps him prepare for his own death. I conclude that in the Phaedo
Socrates persuades himself to be cheerful about death and justifiably hopeful for the afterlife through
his dialogue with others.
Doug Al-Maini, St. Francis Xavier University,
dalmaini@stfx.ca
“Happiness After Death in the Nicomachean Ethics”
Early in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle takes up the topic of the happiness of the dead, wondering if
this happiness is changeable. Ultimately Aristotle concludes that in fact posthumous events can have
affect happiness, but not so much as to make us change our assessment of the dead from happy to
unhappy or vice versa. But are these two claims in fact compatible? For it would seem to be true that
either posthumous events do affect happiness and so at least in principle ought to be able to make a
happy person unhappy, or posthumous events cannot make a happy person unhappy and so are not
really able to affect happiness. This paper aims at showing how Aristotle releases the tension between
these two claims.
Ahmed Alwishah, Pitzer Colleges,
aalwisha@pitzer.edu
“Avicenna on Animals self-Awareness”
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By and large, the writings of medieval and early modern philosophers, Descartes in particular, suggest
two things concerning the Animals self-Awareness: (a) the human beings are the only conscious being in
this world, and (b) animals lack thought, or even, as some believe, the most primitive sense of cognition,
that is, self-awareness. In a number of places in his works Avicenna investigates this subject both
independently and in relation to the self-awareness of humans. In dealing with the question of whether
animals are aware of themselves, Avicenna explicitly asserts that animals do possess the capacity to be
aware of themselves. In his paper I will first show how Avicenna justifies this claim by appealing to his
doctrine of the internal senses, and especially to the faculty of estimation. Second examine his view that
the concomitant relation between the existence of the self and self-awareness is not peculiar only to
human beings; rather it can also be attributed to animals.
James Ambury, Saint Michael's College,
jamesmambury@gmail.com
“Dialectic as Care of the Soul”
This paper interrogates Plato's conception of dialectic and asks the question, what is it about dialectic
that enables human beings to know? Throughout the Platonic corpus, dialectic is variously defined as
simple question and answer, the ascension from hypotheses to first principles, and also as the method of
collection and division. No matter the specific definition, dialectic is the process by which Forms are
disclosed to interlocutors engaged in philosophical discussion. Typical accounts of dialectic treat the
process or method of dialectic in terms of what is being said by the interlocutors about an assortment of
philosophical issues rather than attending to the effect dialectic has on the character of the interlocutor
himself. In my paper I argue that dialectic elicits a fundamental change in the soul of the interlocutor
that thereby actualizes the inherent potential of the soul to grasp philosophical truth. Dialectic stabilizes
the soul and orients it towards the intelligible realm of the Forms, to which it has a natural affinity.
Therefore, while it is true that the dialectical process discloses Forms to the interlocutor, it is only
because it is at the same time the proper care of the soul or the likening of the soul to the object of
knowledge that dialectic can accomplish its noetic revelation. A sustained vision of formal reality
presupposes a conversion of or transformation in the character of the interlocutor through dialectical
question and answer.
Carolina Araujo, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro,
correio.carolina.araujo@gmail.com
“Crafts in the Argument with Polemarchus: A Reading of Republic 1”
The relationship between moral knowledge and craft (technê) is a common topos of the Platonic
dialogues. However, the expression often used to name it, “craft analogy”, tempts us to fall into the error
of assuming an interpretation for which the evidence is far from clear in the texts. Moreover, even if the
actual state of the question discusses the extent of Plato’s commitment to a moral education modeled
on the crafts – a discussion ranging from the view that Plato defends a technical model for virtue to the
view that he attacks it as a sophistic method of teaching, with interpretations that would classify the
dialogues chronologically in accordance to their presentation of crafts ranging somewhere in between –,
what seems completely absent from the debate is the question of whether this is actually the purpose of
the arguments we find in Republic 1.
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What I intend to show in this paper is how the first book of the Republic presents crafts not as a single
model, but as a variety of kinds described according to the categories of restitution, adequacy,
production, community, maintenance and education. This diversity of procedures is shown not in order
to describe an epistemic model, but to allow Socrates to demonstrate their necessary interconnection
within a communitarian craft, one of the models described, that will serve as a primary approach to
politics.
Given that the definition of community is the main point to be sustained by the argument, the
conclusion will be that the relation of the crafts to justice is not an analogical one and the argument is
not an elenctic one resulting in aporia. On the contrary, the argument is inductive, inferring from the
relationship of crafts among themselves a notion of justice as the principle that enables a city to be
founded, a notion that will be resumed in books two (374a4-6) and four (433a1-4). As a consequence,
this reading will contribute to an interpretation of the first book as a prelude to the work as a whole,
inasmuch as it presents the community as a requirement for moral knowledge, thus establishing the
basis upon which the argument for the philosopher-king will be built.

Kelly Arenson, Duquesne University,
arenson.k@gmail.com
“Stealing the Wits of the Wise? The Lucid and the Drunk in Nicomachean Ethics VII.3”
In this paper I address a difficulty faced by a prominent interpretation of Aristotle’s account of akrasia in
Nicomachean Ethics VII.3 in which the akratic is aware of precisely what he ought not do: if the akratic is
lucid in this way, how can we make sense of Aristotle’s analogues of the akratic, namely, the drunk,
madman, and sleeper, who are normally cognitively impaired in ways the lucid akratic is not? I suggest
that Aristotle may be describing two kinds of akrasia in VII.3, a lucid and a non-lucid variety, and the
analogues are meant to typify only the latter. Thus, as parallels of the lucid akratic the analogues do not
fall short since they are not meant as such in the first place.

Anne Ashbaugh, Towson University and Rutgers University,
ashbaugh@rci.rutgers.edu
“Demonic Virtue”
In Plato’s dialogues Socrates claims that he knows when he is acting correctly by the simple fact that his
inner demon has not nay-said the action (e.g., Phdr 242b-c, Apology 31d). Among the many difficulties
that Socrates’ claim presents for the life of reason, two stand out: (1) The contradiction between the
apparent control that a demonic voice exercises over a moral agent in view of the need for said agent to
choose the good rationally, and (2) The potentially pathological state which the hearing of such voices
signals. Regarding the first, given that the Platonic dialogues appear to endorse an ethics based on
autonomous action, what are we to make of this compelling voice taken by commentators to be an
other, a kind of internal oracle that directly touches Socrates but is not part of Socrates’ self? Is the
demon inconsistent with a good life reliant on knowledge and an examined life? Can there be such a
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thing as demonic virtue? That is, can Socrates consistently admit a demon-guided virtue that provokes
and promotes human rectitude? Regarding the second difficulty, are we to admit that philosophy, at
least as practiced by Socrates in the dialogues, depends on a pathological state that risks the proper
functioning of reason? This became an issue for Plutarch and for all thinkers that took seriously the
comments about Socrates’ demon. Plutarch, in fact, goes out of the way to remove all suspicion of
pathology from Socrates’ experience by arguing that having no message in particular, the voice was a
gentle divine prodding particularly suited to guide a soul so gifted that an almost imperceptible touch
sufficed (De genio Socratis, 588 e ff). Olympiodorus, in turn, sought to deny that the demon spoke at all,
suggesting instead that Socrates received an illumination that reached the organ of hearing
(Commentary on the First Acibiades of Plato, 16). The two difficulties concerning Socrates’ inner voice,
one moral the other psychological, threaten the primacy of reason. In this paper, I examine these two
aspects of Socrates’ demon in light of the relevant commentaries and I advance an alternate reading
based on an anaLysis of clues offered by the dialogues.

Emily Austin, Wake Forest University,
austinea@wfu.edu
“Plato on Grief as a Mental Disorder”
Plato’s Republic does not directly address the question of whether the philosopher grieves. Instead,
Socrates’ two substantive discussions of the moral psychology and appropriateness of grief concern the
“decent man” (ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ἀνὴρ, 3: 387d5), who finds it “impossible” (ἀδύνατον, 10:603e8) not to grieve
the death of his child. He desires to grieve, but he restrains himself in public out of a sense of shame. In
private, however, he occasionally gives in to the part of him that desires to grieve “by nature” (φύσει, 10:
606a5). The fact that the decent person manifests a conflicted soul has led commentators to assume
that he is deficiently virtuous, since they think that a virtuous soul would not resist itself or give in
negative emotions. According to this ‘Stoic Reading,’ the decent person makes a mistake about what is
valuable, so that his desire to grieve manifests an error in judgment or perception (see Lorenz (2006, 623), Moss (2008, 54-5), Nussbaum (1984, 70-1)). Given Socrates’s derogatory comments about grief and
his wholesale censorship of its artistic representation, one might be tempted to accept the Stoic reading
and conclude that the Republic advocates eliminating grief.
In this paper, however, I contest the Stoic Reading and offer a defense of what I will call the ‘Conflict
Reading’. I build a textual case that suggests that the decent person’s restrained grieving is the fitting
and appropriate response to a legitimate misfortune. Thus, psychic tension and moderate satisfaction of
a desire to grieve can be both warranted and admirable. By ‘fit,’ I mean that the desire to grieve tracks
an objective harm (e.g., the death of a child), and by ‘appropriate,’ I mean that the decent person
controls and expresses his grief to the benefit of his overall psychological health. Taking the death of a
child as my paradigm case, I show that Plato’s dialogues consistently maintain that children, at least the
good ones, are valuable external goods and that a child’s death objectively harms her parents. The desire
to produce children and other immortal goods (e.g., laws and philosophical works) is both “natural” and
“divine” (Symp. 208b, Lg. 4: 721b-d), and failure on this front is a harm fitting of grief (Menex. 247c248a). Nevertheless, overriding psychological and political considerations shape and limit the
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appropriate expressions of grief. When Socrates provides reasons against indulging in grief, then, he
intends to guide the appropriate expression of a fitting desire to grieve, not to eliminate or altogether
impugn the desire to grieve itself. In short, the death of a child is a true misfortune.

Allan Back, Kutztown University,
fack@kutztown.edu
“Aristotle's Buddhism”
Much of Aristotle’s Metaphysical vocabulary has a relational structure. The form is the form of some
matter; a cause is a cause of the caused; a principle is a principle of something; a predicate is a predicate
of a subject; an actuality is the actuality of some potentiality; even an essence is the essence of some
being. All such statements exhibit the type of conversion taken by Aristotle in the Categories to be
symptomatic of relata: the form is the form of some matter; therefoeree matter is matter for some form
etc. On his own theory such relational items cannot exist in their own right or persist through change of
their attributes: they are “least of all substances”. Like things in the Buddhist doctrine of dependent
origination, their existence is dependent upon their correlatives.
Given Aristotle’s penchant for applying his theory of categories in his ontological studies, would he not
have noted the relational structure of his Metaphysical vocabulary? Indeed, as he himself suggests, the
fact that individual substances are ultimate subjects having no taint of the relational strengthens their
claim of being basic. Here I propose to show how Aristotle’s own doctrine of relations justifies his claim
that constituents of individual substances like its form cannot be substances.

Jesse Bailey, Sacred Heart University,
baileyj34@sacredheart.edu
“'Odysseus Smote His Breast' Internal Conflict and Ethical Living in the Republic and Phaedo"
In this paper, I examine the way Socrates deploys the same Homeric quote (“Odysseus smote his
breast . . .”) in both the Republic and the Phaedo to explain the fragmentation of the self in radically
different ways. The multiplicity and inner conflict of the self, marked by cognitive dissonance and a
disharmonious mode of living, is addressed in many Platonic dialogues. Most notably, of course, in
the Republic Socrates argues that the conflict within the self is ‘mirrored’ by the conflict between classes
in society. In the Phaedo, political conflict is also said to arise from within the multiplicity of the self;
specifically, Socrates says there that all “wars and factions and conflict” arise from conflict between soul
and body (Phaedo 66c). In this paper, I examine the significance of the fact that this quote is used by
Socrates as support for an argument for a unified soul (in opposition to the body) in the Phaedo, on the
one hand, and as support for afragmented soul in opposition to itself in the Republic, on the other.
Ronald Baumiller, University of Western Ontario,
rbaumill@uwo.ca
“What Does Flux Have to do With Naming?”
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The Cratylus can easily be considered Plato’s most comprehensive work on naming and etymology. Yet
there is a further topic in the dialogue which has not received as much attention as it merits, namely,
flux. This paper will first draw an original distinction between the types of flux Plato that recognized. It
then will employ this distinction in order to obtain a clear notion of what flux is and, through textual
evidence, determine the type of flux with which the Cratylus is concerned. In doing so, the role of flux in
Plato’s Cratylus will become apparent. This paper will show that the Cratylus was not only concerned
with a particular type of flux, but this type of flux has its own unique threat to naming and helps us to
better understand the dialogue.

Alina Beary, Baylor University,
alina_beary@baylor.edu
“Socratic Piety in Apology and Phaedo”
Most scholars that investigate the discussion of piety in Euthyphro believe that ultimately Socrates wants
to understand piety as a part of justice. Though varied in their accounts of the way in which piety relates
to justice, scholars are mostly united in shifting the focus away from the wishes of the gods and toward
some virtue that a person might possess. In “Euthyphro's Thesis Revisited,” Panos Dimas challenges this
trend by drawing attention to Socrates’ eagerness at the end of the dialogue to re-examine Euthyphro’s
second definition. Dimas suggests that a person’s desire to please the gods constitutes an indispensable
part of piety. I argue that the picture of Socrates’ personal piety, presented in Apology and Phaedo,
sheds additional light on the discussion in "Euthyphro." It supports Dimas’ reading over those readings
that seek to ground piety exclusively in the notion of justice. Socratic piety in Apology, and especially in
Phaedo, cannot be explained without a reference to the wishes and desires of the gods.

Martha Beck, Lyon College,
martha.beck@lyon.edu
“The Veneer of Barbarism: Ignoring the Insights of Ancient Greek Wisdom in the Era of Globalization”
This paper tries to show that the insights of Ancient Greek wisdom are still relevant today and can
provide guidance as we move toward what seems to be a historically unique complex network of
interrelationships between human beings all over the world and between human society and the natural
world. The paper focuses on only two of the deities of the Olympian pantheon: Aphrodite, goddess of
beauty and Ares, god of war. The paper discusses the violent and unnatural birth of Aphrodite, the
extreme attraction they feel toward each other, and their relationships to the other deities and to human
beings. Like all the other deities, each of them can be either sacred and motivate human beings to noble
achievements or they can drive individuals and societies to self-destruction.
The story of the Trojan War is the story of two cities in conflict because they reject wisdom as their
cultural bedrock. Instead, Troy is the city dedicated to pleasure and wealth, Aphrodite, leading to a
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young Prince whose drive for personal pleasure leads to the complete destruction of his city. The
Achaeans, although they have a just cause, are really motivated by the desire for power, Ares, leading
the bravest young man into a power struggle with the “ruler” in charge and extending the war for ten
years.
The paper then applies these stories, these cautionary tales, to the way international development is
taking place today. At the moment, development is focused disproportionately on economic growth. We
seem to be creating a world of consumers, people conditioned to believe that working for a higher and
higher material standard of living will lead to the greatest good for all. In other words, we are
worshipping Aphrodite and not noticing that she will always bring Ares with her: faction and conflict
within every nation and between nations. Individually and collectively, we are making the same
mistakes, the mistakes the Greeks thought were the most obvious.
The paper also suggests that all aspects of Ancient Greek culture—institutions, festivals, literature, etc.—
are structured to try and inspire as many people as possible to recognize the importance of dedicating
themselves to the love of wisdom throughout their lives and showing them the great destruction that
occurs when they choose pleasure/wealth or power/glory instead. In spite of the historical fact that
Ancient Greek culture was used over and over to justify the greatest destruction and injustices of the
colonial era, a fair understanding of the culture shows that the founders and those who carried the
vision of a city governed by Athena, the goddess of justice and wisdom, can provide insights and ideas
for the development of international culture today.

Aryya Bhattacharya, Vivekananda College For Women, Calcutta University,
aryyab@gmail.com
“I-consciousness and Cosmogony--the Unique Approach of Trika Philosophy”
Kashmir Saivism (also known as Trika Philosophy) is a rather neglected branch of Indian Philosophy.
References to Saivism based on Agamas can be dated back to the era of the Mahabharata. But it was
only later around the 11th century that it reached its pinnacle of glory under Abhinavagupta (1014 A.D.),
the great Saivist of Kashmir. His theory marks a confluence of religion, philosophy and the mystical
spiritual thoughts of the Sakti oriented Kaula, Krama and Kalinya schools. The Trika philosophy
encompasses cosmogony, epistemology, metaphysics, the theory of liberation etc. all of which are
related to the Supreme consciousness, which in reality is nothing but the I-consciousness at its fullest. An
important point of focus is the area of the relation between the World, Parama Siva (the Supreme
Consciousness) and Sakti (Supreme awareness and freedom).
In the history of philosophy Dualism (eg. Samkhya) and Monism (eg, Vedanta), or Realism and Idealism
have always stood in opposition to each other. Any attempts at reconciliation, as far as philosophical
systems are concerned, either proved to be futile or resulted in giving importance to one over another.
Abhinavagupta is perhaps the only Indian philosopher who has pioneered a theory of metaphysics and
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cosmogony that is based on the assumption of ‘Identity in Difference’ within a set up of Realistic
Idealism
In this article the author has established the logic behind such assumption and shown how the theory of
Abhnavagupta is different from Samkhya and Vedanta systems, yet an amalgamation of .all the two,
thereby being a thesis which is both unique and exclusive as a school of thought.

Ruby Blondell, University of Washington,
blondell@uw.edu
“Gorgias: The Founding Father of Feminism”
Plato's Socrates famously argues that a woman's psyche is not intrinsically different from a man's (Rep.
454c). In this paper I shall argue that this radical claim was anticipated by the sophist Gorgias in his
Encomium of Helen.
Gorgias argues that Helen is not guilty of eloping with Paris because she was either abducted by violence
or overcome by the power of the gods, persuasion, or eros, all of which render her a helpless object and
therefore blameless (Helen 6, 20). The latter two forces, which occupy the bulk of the speech, function
through their impact on the psyche. The argument seems, superficially, to rely on conventional
categories of Greek gender ideology that draw a bright line between male and female, identifying agency
with the male and passivity with the female, a line grounded partly in the perception of the female
psyche as more susceptible to emotion than the male. Yet Gorgias draws his examples from distinctively
masculine spheres of activity, notably the battlefield (16-17), public speeches (13), and intellectual life
(13). His argument is thus based on the idea that all people, male and female, are subject to the same
kinds of forces and have souls that react in similar ways. It follows that if Helen is a mere passive object,
devoid of any responsibility for her actions, the same is true of men--even men engaged in the most
significant defining activities of masculinity.
As a defense of Helen this argument is, Gorgias tells us, a "plaything" or joke (21). Yet he leaves us with a
challenge that escape the confines of his joke. Given his account of human psychology, which he
presents as grounded in the observation of facts, is there really any difference between the female
psyche and the male?

Geoffrey Bowe, İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey
geoffrey.bowe@gmail.com
“Neoplatonism, and the Emanation Cosmogony of Avicenna”
This study traces the significance of Neoplatonic cosmogony of emanation in Islamic philosophy, with a
special focus on the harmony between the theory of emanation in Avicenna and the Muslim nature
mysticism of unity of being (al-Wahadat al-Wujud).
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Geoff Bowe, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul,
geoffrey.bowe@gmail.com
“Organic Imitation vs Neoplatonic Emanation”
This paper argues that Aristotle's metaphysical outlook presents us with as much of an imitative system,
as does Plato's. In what I call a system of organic imitation in Aristotle, being understood pros hen
equivocally is a manifestation of an unchangeable exemplar, in an organic cosmos. In other words
Aristotle's solution to the diaspora of forms and particulars still leaves the question of why being does
what it does unanswered. Plotinus' attempt to provide a more fluid account of the relationship of being
to an unchangeable unity under the rubric of Platonic metaphysics attempts to resolve lacunae
engendered by Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. I argue that Plotinus sees the value of Aristotle's
organic imitation but also the explanatory lacuna at a number of levels, and this introduces an emanative
metaphysics that provides a path to and from the source of being that is to have a profound affect on
religious philosophy and mysticism.

Luigi Bradizza, Salve Regina University,
luigi.bradizza@salve.edu
“Father to Son: Cyrus's Wordly Education in Xenophon's Cyropaedia”
In Book I, chapter 6 of Xenophon's Cyropaedia, Cambyses offers a political education to his son Cyrus.
That education aims Cyrus at worldly success, understood as ruling over an empire. Indeed, Cambyses
would have Cyrus subordinate both human and divine things to the satisfaction of his imperial
ambitions. This subordination requires the use of men, nations, and gods as a means to Cyrus's personal,
worldly ends. Cyrus is thus brought to view the cosmos in reductionistic terms, and he learns to appeal
to the lower parts of men's souls. It is the argument of this paper that, while the education Cyrus
receives from his father is undoubtedly effective in gaining Cyrus an empire, it does so at the cost of a
fuller capacity for human flourishing in both Cyrus and his imperial subjects. Cambyses's education of
Cyrus thus points to a tragic disjunction between politics and higher pursuits (which include religion,
philosophy, and art), with success in one coming at the cost of success in the other.

David Buchta, Brown University, david_buchta@brown.edu.
“Is Postulation (Arthāpatti) Distinct from Inference (Anumāna)?”
Some schools of Classical Indian Philosophy, including Advaita Vedānta, identify Postulation (Arthāpatti)
as a distinct Means of Knowing (Pramāṇa), while other schools, including Nyāya, account for the same
type of Knowing (Pramiti) through a subtype of Inference (Anumāna), specifically Inference with Only
Negative Concomitance (Kevala-vyatireki Anumāna). This paper will consider the issues involved in this
disagreement, particularly focusing on two late (17th century) contributions which have the benefit of
summarizing long developed positions: Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra’s Vedāntaparibhāṣā and Annambhaṭṭa’s
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Tarkasaṅgraha. Following Adhvarīndra, I will argue for the distinct identification of Postulation, based on
the methodological difference between it and other forms of Inference. Further, I will argue that Nyāya’s
use of Inference with Only Negative Concomitance creates epistemological problems, forcing the least
principled component in their identification of potential logical fallacies, namely that an Inferential
Reason (Hetu) may be Overridden (Bādhita).

David Butorac, Fatih University, Istanbul
“The way up and down are not one and the same. Systematic problems of Procline science”
With both the İamblichean theory of the descended soul incorporated into his system and the continued
integration of Aristotelian science, Proclus must develop a system wherein the finite human perspective
and the demand for a superior perspective in beginning from a higher and more universal principle are
reconciled. However, İ argue that this creates tremendous problems and ambiguities, as for instance
when he elaborates how the soul acts or is when it knows different levels of causes. The soul is dianoetic
and yet it must have some sort of noesis qualitatively different from dianoia with higher causes, but
what would this look like? Scholars have not yet clarified this adequately. This paper will outline the
integration of Aristotle in Syrianus and Proclus, it will then look at central texts on the soul's dianoia and
noesis, and finally it will look back from Damascius to evaluate these from a critical yet Neoplatonic
standpoint.

Eva Cadavid, Centre College,
eva.cadavid@centre.edu
“On Mathematical definitions, signification, and mathematical objects”
In Posterior Analytics II.10, Aristotle presents us with a discussion of definition and outlines different
types of definitions, although how many is debatable and not relevant to this paper. It is clear from his
discussion that he distinguishes between signifying (that it is) and explanation (why it is) definitions. He
offers the definition of a mathematical object as an example of a signifying definition. Mathematical
definitions give us genus and differentia. The puzzle is whether mathematical definitions can also be full
explanations. If so, what sort of explanation do they give? Do they offer more than just an explanation
of what it is to be a mathematical or the internal implication of a signifying definition?
An additional puzzle is raised when we consider that mathematical objects are separable in thought and
that there is a type of fictionalism that mathematicians engage in when they define and postulate the
objects of their science. The mathematician must not only define what a point is, but she must posit its
existence. What do mathematical definitions signify independently of the mathematician?
In this paper, I explore mathematical definitions as signifying definitions and argue that they can also be
explanations. Charles, Bayer, and others have argued for a unified account of definition that can also be
applicable to mathematical definitions even if Aristotelian mathematics involves the use of fictions.
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Silvia Carli, Skidmore College,
silvia.2016@yahoo.com
“Aristotle on the Temporality of Human Life”
According to the definition of the Physics, time is “the number of movement (kinesis) with respect to the
before and after” (Phys. 10.11.219b2). Kinesis is a process of “becoming other” whose parts are different
from one another and from the whole movement (NE 10. 1174a20-27). As the actuality of the potential
qua potential (Phys. 3.2.201a10-11), moreover, it is always incomplete (Phys. 3.2.201b31-32; Met.
9.6.1048b29; NE. 10.4.1174b2), as the attainment of its telos is the cessation of the movement. To the
extent that human beings spend their lives in the rapidly changing world of human affairs, and transform
their surroundings and their relations to others through their actions, their life can be said to be
measured by the time of the Physics. On the other hand, once an agent has acquired a stable character,
acting is the actualization (energeia) of the lasting dispositions (hexeis) that constitute her ethical nature.
Aristotle distinguishes energeia from kinesis: unlike the latter, the former has its end in itself
(Met.9.6.1048b22) and, rather than being a process of becoming other, is an activity in which the
potential is preserved “by what is actual and is like it” (DA 2.5.417b3-4). In addition, it is complete at any
and every time (NE 10.4.1174a15-18; b5). In a number of passages the philosopher indicates that the
difference between kinesis and energeia manifests itself also as a difference in their temporal structure.
He writes, for instance, that “it is not true that at the same time a thing . . . is being moved and has been
moved” (Met. 9.6.1048b30-32). Given that “what is being moved is different from what has been moved,
and what is moving from what has moved” (Met. 9.6.1048b33-33), its duration is measured by
successive and different “now” (nun). By contrast, we can say that “at the same time (ama) we are living
well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy” (Met. 9.6.1048b25-26).
The goal of this paper is to analyze the nature of “the time of energeia,” and to explore the relation
between the two dimensions of the temporality of the good life.

Rose Cherubin, George Mason University,
rcherubi@gmu.edu
“What Is Not Accomplished: Inquiry, Explanation, and Fifth-Century Responses to Parmenides”
Did any thinkers in the generation after Parmenides respond to his concerns regarding the requisites of
inquiry and their relationship to familiar opinions about the way what is is?
I argue that at least some later fifth-century philosophical work shows awareness of these concerns. The
extant fragments of that work provide evidence that responses to Parmenides were not limited to
support for, dismissal of, or argument against monism; and evidence that his influence went beyond a
tendency to incorporate argument in philosophy, and beyond the adoption of the principle that nothing
comes from nothing.
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Zeno’s subject matter and extensive use of argument clearly reflect Parmenidean influence, as is
generally acknowledged; less studied but perhaps equally important is the absence of direct ontological
claims (in the sense of claims about what is) in his fragments. This absence appears more sharply when
contrasted with Melissus’ explicit and emphatic conclusions about the nature of what is.
Anaxagoras and the Atomists are also sensitive to Parmenides’ caveats, whether or not they take them
to be decisive. Their arguments against, and alternatives to, the goddess’s assertions about how what-is
must be understood on a viable road of inquiry reflect that they take her arguments seriously. I suggest
that their focus is not only on her claims about the nature of what is, but also on the relationship
between claims about what is and the possibility of explanation.

Scott Cleveland, Baylor University,
scott_cleveland@baylor.edu
“Aristotle’s Account of Courage: Why Courage is More than Mere Structural Excellence”
Sometimes a distinction is drawn between two kinds of moral virtue. The putative distinguishing feature
is that some virtues require action in accord with good reasons and some do not. The latter are merely
structural, agential excellences utilizable for any task the agent chooses, even unjust actions. The merely
agential excellence kind of virtue has been called structural virtue, executive virtue, or virtue of willpower. The kind of virtue that requires good reason has been called motivational virtue, substantive
virtue, or virtue of attachment. Courage is supposed to be a prime example of a structural virtue.
Justice is supposed to be a prime example of a motivational virtue.
I set out and defend Aristotle’s account of courage in the Nicomachean Ethics and argue that it provides
reason to reject that courage is a structural virtue. I summarize Aristotle’s courage as firmness of mind in
apt pursuit, with fitting fear and fitting confidence, of a difficult good. I argue that courage has three
major parts: a skill (know-how) part, an emotional part, and a reasons part. The first part includes
conceptual, perceptual and self-management skills. The second involves the fit between the agent’s
emotions of fear and confidence and the situation. The third involves the agent’s reasons for action.
I defend Aristotle’s view from the objection that it is too strong – that courage is essentially reducible to
its skill components. This putative reducibility provides strong reason to suppose that courage is a
structural virtue. I defend Aristotle’s rejection of this reduction this by way of engaging a question
discussed by contemporary moral philosophers: does a daring murderer act with courage? Those who
answer ‘no’ to this question often cite that it is the murderer’s bad reasons for action that prevent the
act from counting as courageous. While I side with those who answer this question in the negative, I try
to motivate another reason for this view on the basis of courage’s requiring fear and confidence fit to the
situation. It is the murderer’s failure of emotional attunement with the situation that undermines the
courageousness of his action, even despite his aptitude at the skill components of courage. For example,
he fails to fittingly fear the corruption to his character the murder will cause. Finally, I conclude that
Aristotle’s account of courage favors rejecting the view that courage is a structural virtue.
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Clinton Corcoran, High Point University,
ccorcora@highpoint.edu
“The Menexenus, Socrates, and the Battle of Arginusae”
The Menexenus presents some of the most complex tonal problems in the entire Platonic corpus.
Charles Kahn calls the dialogue a “riddle,” “for this little work is almost certainly the most enigmatic of all
of Plato’s writings.” In the Menexenus misdirection, omission, euphemism, and misplaced emphasis
seem to carry Socrates’ revisionist history of Athens. As Stephen Salkever observes, “over half of the
epitaphios in the Menexenus (239d1-46a3) is chock-full of errors, omissions, and hyperbole,” yet, “even
though the dialogue’s opening and closing conversation are insistently playful and ironic, the speech also
presents a picture of good Athenian citizenship that seems plausibly Platonic or Socratic.” No line is
perhaps more outrageous than when Socrates claims that Athens, by winning the battle of Arginusae
(406BCE), “won not only that naval engagement, but also the rest of the war.” The battle, the last great
Athenian victory of the Peloponnesian War, represented the last occasion when peace with Sparta could
have been achieved on favorable terms. Socrates’ reasoning for claiming victory is “...that our city could
never be defeated in war, not even by all mankind. And that belief was true. We were overcome by our
own quarrels, not by other men; by them we remain undefeated to this day, but we conquered ourselves
and suffered defeat at our own hands” (243 c-d). Those ‘quarrels’ again resurface in Plato’s Apology at
32 a-e where Socrates recounts his involvement in the trial of the eight victorious Athenian generals who
were accused of failing to recover the Athenian survivors and dead following the naval engagement. This
paper explores the question of what, if any, sense can be made of Socrates’ claim that by winning at
Arginusae Athens won the Peloponnesian War.

Carlos Cortissoz, SUNY Binghamton,
ccortis1@binghamton.edu
“Psychology of the State. Plato, Virtue Politics and the Collective Mind”
Departing from Plato's so called "City-Soul Analogy" and contemporary discussions on group agency, my
paper discusses two interconnected ideas. On the one hand, the conceptual possibility to conceive of a
collective mind, bearer of genuinely collective mental states. There really are desires, beliefs, emotions,
etc. that we hold as a group, are not reducible to a function of individual ones, and are to a certain
extent unified. On the other hand, the idea that political communities are to be conceived of, as I argue
Plato did, as complex fabrics of collective mental states and not as sets of conventional institutions.
Justice is then not a virtue of interpersonal relationships (enforced upon individuals through institutional
arrangements), but the fundamental virtue of a group agent. I argue that it is only under such an
understanding of the state that virtue ethics can transcend the discourse of political virtues (an effect
perhaps of its excessive Aristotelianism) and grow into a genuine virtue politics.

Anna Cremaldi, Appalachian State University,

Abstracts, SAGP/SSIPS 2012, Page 14 of 75

September 17, 2012

cremaldiam@appstate.edu
“The Idea of the Entire Soul in Nicomachean Ethics I.13”
Aristotle’s reference in the Nicomachean Ethics to a passage in Plato’s Charmides raises a puzzle about
the sense in which Aristotle views politics as a science. In this paper, I argue that the reference suggests
that politics is scientific for Aristotle insofar as it investigates definitions in the manner outlined in the
Posterior Analytics. Aristotle writes in the Nicomachean Ethics that “the student of politics must know
somehow the facts of the soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes must know about the whole body
also.…” (I.13). This passage echoes a passage in Plato’s Charmides in which Socrates claims that one
cannot have knowledge of the eye without knowledge of the body (156c; cf. Phaedrus 270c). In one
sense, the passages express the same emphasis on knowing the ‘whole’: there can be no scientific
knowledge of some entity without knowledge of the whole of which it is a part. But, the passages also
appear to express importantly different points. Whereas the Charmides emphasizes comprehensive,
philosophical knowledge of the human body for knowledge of the eye, it is not clear that Aristotle
endorses an analogous view – namely, that comprehensive, philosophical knowledge of the soul is
required for knowledge of virtue. After all, Aristotle’s account of the soul in NE I.13 is ‘inexact’ and
suitable for exoteric presentation, according to his own assessment. If Aristotle endorses the Charmides’
emphasis on thorough knowledge of body as part of an account of the eye, why does he fail to provide a
thorough account of the soul as part of his account of virtue? D.S. Hutchinson attempts to explain the
omission as Aristotle’s deliberate attempt to distance his conception of politics as an inexact science
from Plato’s conception of politics as an exact science. However, Hutchinson’s reading ignores the
multiple senses in which Aristotle may have referred to knowledge of the ‘whole.’ In this paper, I argue
for a different explanation. Aristotle’s brief statement about the soul in NE I.13 is part of the process of
providing the most complete definition of virtue according the standards for definition outlined in the
Posterior Analytics. The upshot of my interpretation is that it shows that politics can be science in the
sense that it investigates definitions.

Matthew Dasti, Bridgewater State University,
mdasti@bridgew.edu
“Is Yogic Experience a Subspecies of Perception?”
The Nyāya tradition of classical India is well-known for its various rational arguments for God’s existence.
What is less explored, however, is the Nyāya claim that experiences of the sort reported by yogis—which
are said to have entities like the deep self and God as their objects—are in fact instances of perception, a
well-trusted and familiar knowledge-source. This paper will examine and unpack Nyāya arguments for
the validity of “yogic perception” in the work of thinkers like Vātsyāyana (c. 450 CE), Uddyotakara (c. 600
CE), Jayanta (c. 875 CE) and Udayana (c. 975 CE). Having briefly looked at the broader conception of
mysticism and yogic experience in Indian thought, we will consider Nyāya accounts of perception and the
attempts of Naiyāyikas (Nyāya thinkers) to categorize such experience as a subspecies of perception,
which involves what I call the "principled extension of knowledge sources." Classical objections to such
an extension will be considered along with contemporary analogues.
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Charles DiSimone, Ludwig-Maxmilians-University/Stanford University,
charlesdisimone@gmail.com
“Thus Have We Read: Untangling the Intertextuality in Mahāyāna Sūtra Literature”
The Śikṣāsamuccaya, or Compendium of Training, is a seventh century manual for would be Mahāyāna
bodhisattvas written by the famed mahāyānika monk Śāntideva. To say that Śāntideva is the author is
somewhat problematic as the several hundred page text is actually a compilation of selections from
ninety-seven separate Mahāyāna works that Śāntideva edited around twenty-seven root kārikās, a form
of verse where the author concisely states his ideological stance, into one coherent text with its own
meaning and purpose quite distinct from the content and historical time of its component works. In this
paper I will explore aspects of intertextuality in the Śikṣāsamuccaya. My purpose for examining these
instances of intertextuality is twofold. First, by pointing out very similar passages from sūtras quoted in
the Śikṣāsamuccaya, I wish to perhaps shed some light on the textual production of early Mahāyāna
sūtras. Second, by creating an archaeology of citational practice in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, I hope to create
a starting point for future research which will decipher: why this text was created in its particular sociohistorical milieu; what made this intertextual methodology so valuable to
Śāntideva as opposed to other, more traditional, methods of textual creation; and are various methods
of reading the text more or less useful within the field of Buddhist Studies?

Charlene Elsby, McMaster University,
elsbyc@mcmaster.ca
“Fictional Entities in Aristotle: Truth as a Function of Combination”
In this paper I will examine the nature of combination in an attempt to identify what particular sort of
combination is required for either a subject term or its referent (a thing) to have a truth-value. The
problem can be summarized as that of locating where falsehood is introduced, i.e., whether an inexistent
object itself may be described as false, or whether falsehood is introduced when we attempt to
predicate anything of a subject term whose referent does not exist (in the sense implied in De
Interpretatione, such that non-existent terms symbolize affections of the soul of which there is no
likeness in the extramental realm). It might seem (as Carson notes) that a combination of concepts not
corresponding to a combination of things would give rise to a false subject term; however, a fictional
entity (such as the goat-stag) is stated in the De Interpretatione to have no truth value unless some
predicate is added. The combination of subject and verb is, for this reason, stated to be the shortest
form of discourse in Plato’s Sophist; whereas strings of nouns do not qualify, for they have no truthvalue. The possibility of true and false singular terms also arises in the Cratylus; however, in this context,
the possibility of false terms serves as the premise leading to a naturalistic theory of word meaning as its
conclusion, a theory which Aristotle rejects. I will use these discussions to distinguish between
combinations giving rise to a fictional entity and those having a truth-value.
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I conclude that for Aristotle combination is a necessary rather than sufficient condition for attributing to
something the quality of truth or falsity. Combinations in thought resulting in our having a concept of a
fictional entity do not have a truth-value. Rather, whether something has a truth-value or not depends
on what kinds of things are combined, and whereas Plato assumes having a truth-value is a quality
necessary of any definable part of discourse, Aristotle distinguishes between things said and things
having a truth value using the necessary condition of combination. In discussing the notion of an image
in relation to its subject (the context in which the goat-stag arises in Plato’s Republic, and an example of
homonymity which Aristotle defines in the Categories), I conclude that Aristotle’s notion of existence
precludes attributing existence to the subject of an image (as well as a thought); that is, the fact that
something is represented gives it no kind of existence. That something non-existent is represented leads
to Aristotle to define the representation as a false, existent thing, and in this way the homonymity of an
image and the thing it represents can be explained as the correspondence of the falsity of the
representation to the non-existence of the subject.

Mark Erste, Jr., Franciscan University of Steubenville,
merstejr@gmail.com
“The Universal Psychology Underpinning the Educational Theory in Plato’s Republic”
Although the theory of primary education in Plato’s Republic focuses on the particular causal link
between the ideal curriculum designed in Books II and III and the well-ordered soul, careful textual
anaLysis suggests that this theory relies on a set of universal psychological insights into the link between
education per se and the soul. AnaLysis of this link reveals that it can serve as the foundation for an
expansion of Plato’s theory to account for the effect of any type of primary education on the order of the
soul. Such an expansion would take the connection between the well-ordered soul and the ideal
curriculum and generalize it to include the connection between the different curricula and the
corresponding orders of soul, whether the ideal order of Book IV or a deviant order from Books VIII or IX.
The possibility of expansion, however, does not suggest that Plato explicitly held such a universal theory,
except in its seed form. The development of these psychological insights and the expansion of Plato’s
theory would deepen our understanding of his philosophy of education by identifying the processes by
which he sees education impacting the soul, politics, culture and the constitution of the state. Further,
such an exposition will allow his educational principles to be applied to disordered souls, help explain his
theory of censorship, and help establish the validity of his claims. I will begin to develop such a universal
theory first by analyzing Plato’s text to examine the kinds of educational influences he identifies. Next I
will elucidate the two steps by which these influences affect the soul: the production of virtue and vice
and the impact of these on the order of the soul. By these analyses, I will attempt to demonstrate that
the psychology of the Republic supports the existence of a universal, causal link between educational
influences and the order of the soul.

Mohsen Eslami, United Nations,
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eslami_mohsen@yahoo.com>
“The Logic of Contemporary Shi`a Political Philosophy of `Legal Supremacy of the Judiciary’ in a
Tripartite State”
Plato’s model of tripartite branches of government has been the basis of a number of modifications,
notably John Locke’s doctrine of priority of the legislative branch to promote laissez faire capitalism. This
study clarifies the premises and the logic of arguments proffered for the concept of modern Islamic
Republic (as established in Iran and Afghanistan) and its variation of both Plato’s ancient political
philosophy and the medieval theory of prophetic imagination in Avicenna, Maimonides and Averroes.

Christos Evangeliou, Towson University,
cevang@aol.com
“The Power of Eros: Can Love Overcome Death?”
In Plato’s Symposium, Socrates is represented as objecting to the five previous encomiasts of Eros, that
they failed to reveal the truth about the nature and power of Love as a force of life.
The Platonic Socrates also claims that he is in a position to reveal to them the truth about Eros, since the
wise Diotima had taught it to him previously. He proceeds to elaborate on the three possible ways in
which Love can help mortal man to overcome the unavoidable Death, that is, by biological reproduction,
cultural production, and self-perfection of the true lover of wisdom.
In this paper, we will consider each of these three alternative ways to immortality with emphasis on the
third, in order to show that in this dialogue Plato did not lapsed into skepticism, as it has been alleged,
regarding the immortality of the soul. On the contrary, his presentation in this work strengthens his
theory of self-knowledge, self-love, self-perfection and assimilation to God. A similar view is expressed
also in the Indian conception of identification of Atman and Brahman.

Shane Ewegen, Stonehill College,
sewegen@stonehill.edu
“'Of the Swans': Socratic Music in the Phaedo and Apology”
During the final hours of his life Socrates tells a story about swans (oi kuknoi) (Phd. 84e-85b), claiming
that they sing more beautifully as they get closer to death. However, Socrates does not merely evoke the
figure of the swans—he identifies himself with them, claiming to share their prophetic knowledge of the
future and to be a fellow servant to Apollo. Socrates—at least according to Socrates himself—is of the
swans (ton kuknon).
I will offer an anaLysis of the role of the prophetic swan for the ancient Greeks in general (i.e., Aespo,
Homer, et al). Then I will turn to an anaLysis of the precise character of Socrates’ self-identification with
the swans in the Phaedo. Some outstanding scholarly work has already been done in indicating the
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extent to which Socrates ‘sings’ throughout the course of the Phaedo. I would like to go further in this
direction by examining the precise character of Socratic music in general in light of his self-identification
with the swans. Broadly stated, Socratic music will be identified with a mode of speech that proceeds
out of an awareness of human finitude and (Socratic) ignorance, as well as an awareness of the limits of
human logos. Parallel to this awareness of finitude is an awareness of the gods (especially Apollo) whose
very nature is such as to exceed our finitude and cast it into relief.
Following this anaLysis I will turn a Platonic text in which this music can be seen to operate: the Apology.
From the beginning of the Apology, Socrates calls attention to his own mode of discourse (legein),
claiming that it will not be of the same sort as his accusers’: rather, his words will be ‘spoken at random’
and yet will precisely thereby be true (17c). I would like to suggest that Socrates’ self-identification with
the swans in the Phaedo can shed light on his mode of discourse operative within the Apology. In short, I
will argue that the logos of the Apology is, no less than the logos of the Phaedo, a swan-song, one meant
to underscore human finitude. Indeed, I will go so far as to suggest that there is something essentially
swan-like about Socrates’ philosophical practice in general, at least so far as this can be gleaned from the
Apology.

Zoli Filotas, McGill University,
edwin.filotas@mail.mcgill.ca
“Aristotle on Kinds Community and Kinds of Rule”
In his discussions of assymetrical friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics (as well as the parallel passage in
the EE), Aristotle writes that the forms of friendship in the family correspond to different constitutions—
marriage, he says, is like aristocracy, fatherhood like monarchy, and so on. It is not, however,
immediately obvious what the analogy with constitutions is supposed to illustrate about personal
relationships: what, for example, is the difference between a ‘monarchical’ and an ‘aristocratic’
relationship if exactly one person rules in both cases?
Aristotle suggests that the relationships differ because they are governed by what we might call different
‘divisions of labour’. A father rules over his child in every respect, a husband over his wife in certain areas
delimited by their respective natures, and brothers over each other by taking turns, more or less
arbitrarily. I argue that we can better understand these sketchy comments if we connect them to
Aristotle’s claim at EN III 1111b28 that “things which come about through the agency of our friends do
so in a way through our own agency, since their origin is in us." Aristotle is there suggesting that the
psychic processes associated with an action—decision, deliberation, and practical perception—can in
some cases be shared by more than one individual. More specifically, the deliberation of one person can
in some cases have its origin (arche) in the decision of another. (This, I suggest, becomes clearer if we
see the decision as providing a final cause, rather than merely an efficient one, for the deliberations of
another person.)
This relationship between the decision of one person and the deliberation of another, I suggest, is simply
the relationship of ‘rule’ (archein or arche). It corresponds neatly to the definition of personal rule at
Metaphysics Delta, according to which whenever one person rules another, the other moves or changes
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according to the ruler’s decision (kata proairesis, 1013a10-11). And the anaLysis of different kinds of
cooperation invoked by the analogy with the constitutions allows us to better understand Aristotle’s
claim—which he announces with some fanfare at the beginning of the Politics—that there are several
different kinds of rule. The discussion of the natural differences between slaves, women, and children in
terms of their deliberative faculties suggests precisely that while the head of the household rules over
his wife, his children, and his slaves, he can do so in a variety of ways, depending on how the deliberative
capacities of the people ruled (when they have such capacities) do and do not contribute toward his
decisions.

Melissa Fitzpatrick, Loyola Marymount University,
melfitz@gmail.com
“The Complexity of Form in Aristotle’s Metaphysics”
This paper seeks to propose a solution to a potential contradiction in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: 1)
Aristotle’s assertion that form is primary substance, 2) his declaration that form is a universal such,
rather than a this (Zeta 7-9), and 3) his dismissal of the universal as a viable candidate for primary
substance (Zeta 13). I will attempt to show how Aristotle’s rejection of the universal as primary
substance in Zeta 13 is a dialectical response to his investigation of substance as the underlying subject
in Zeta 7-9, thus securing unity in Book Zeta’s moving investigation, while shedding light on what appears
to be an explicit contradiction in the Metaphysics. I will begin with a general overview of Book Zeta’s
project, and provide close readings of Aristotle’s investigation of primary substance as the underlying
subject in Zeta 7-9, i.e., his treatment of form as a universal such, and his arguments against the
universal as primary substance in Zeta 13. I will then illustrate how Zeta 7-9 and Zeta 13 are intimately
connected, and how their dialogue contributes to Aristotle’s project at large.

John Garner, Villanova University,
john.garner@villanova.edu
“The Lesson of the Arithmetical Example: Two Interpretations of Plato's Hippias Major, 301d3-303c4”
In the Hippias Major, 301d3-303c4, Socrates uses an arithmetical example to refute the “continuity
principle” proposed by Hippias, i.e., the principle stating that both member of a pair (qua together) must
share in exactly the same attribute that each member of the pair (qua individual) shares in. Socrates
argues against this view, suggesting that both members of a pair together can participate in evenness, all
while each member participates in oddness. While Socrates clearly uses the arithmetical notions of
evenness and oddness to refute Hippias, it is not so easy to determine exactly how this refutation takes
place, or what lesson the refutation is supposed to be. H.-G. Gadamer gives one compelling
interpretation of Socrates' example. In fact, his reading of the lesson greatly influenced his own
philosophy, for Gadamer found in his interpretation of the example a “model” for a theory of the
communal nature of reason as such. His reading hinged on two theses. First, he argued, Socrates uses
arithmetic to prove that both members of a pair must participate in some attribute not shared in by
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each. Second, Socrates' lesson, he suggested, is not merely a lesson about arithmetic, but also a lesson
about the very nature of reason (logos) and about its basis in human communities; the lesson provides a
model of communal reason as such, which cannot be private or merely individual. If we follow in some
sense Gadamer's second thesis--i.e., his suggestion of a parallel between the structure of the “arithmos
paradigm” (i.e., the model of community proposed in the arithmentical example) and the structure of
reason (logos)--, we might nevertheless question one aspect of his first thesis, concerning the
interpretation of the example itself. As I shall argue, rather than proving the /impossibility/ of continuity
between the community's attributes and those of its constituents (as Gadamer suggests), the lesson
actually indicates that such a continuity is /possible/ but it is not guaranteed. That is, continuity
between the attributes of a community and the attributes of its constituent elements, or its individual
members, holds in some cases and does not hold in others. This seemingly minor difference in the
interpretation of Socrates' lesson has major implications for how we might envision community and
reason. At stake is the difference between, on the one hand, a community which must insist upon the
irreconcilability of individual and group (which I take to be a consequence of Gadamer's interpretation)
and, on the other hand, a community admitting that, while agreement between the group and the
individual is not /guaranteed/ in any situation, such agreement is at least /possible/ and is perhaps even
sometimes actual in good communities.

Erikk Geannikis, Catholic University of America,
emgeannikis@gmail.com
“Aristotle's Intelligible Matter and the Ontology of the Geometrical Object”
The phrase “intelligible material (hulê noêtê)” only appears three times in the corpus of Aristotle: twice
in Met. Z.10-11, and once in Met. H.6. Most commentators report that the phrase in Met. H.6 conveys a
different meaning for intelligible material than do the Met. Z passages. Adherents to this standard view
take the instances of hulê noêtê in Met. Z.10-11 to signify something like “extension,” and take the same
phrase in Met. H.6 to signify the genus (“material”) element of a standard genus-species definition.
Contrary to this view, my paper shows that the instance of hulê noêtê in Met. H.6 can be understood as
in complete accord with the earlier Met. Z.10-11 instances if we do not interpret intelligible material as
extension, but rather as the generative substrate for mathematical objects. The argument for this is in
three parts: First, I focus on a passage from Met. Z.3 on the dangers of “abstraction.” Alongside John
Cleary, I interpret this passage in reference to a logical method of subtraction, and show that the passage
culminates in a reductio ad absurdum. “Abstraction” leads to an inappropriate and inaccurate
characterization of a separation between material substrate and formal attributes, which Aristotle does
not accept. Second, I examine passages from the subsequent progression of Met. Z to find that Aristotle
abandons the conclusions of the abstractive procedure in favor of an adjectival conception of material.
This adjectival sense is brought out by the role of material as the substrate for composite generation,
detailed in Met. Z, and Θ.7. It is this conception that informs and allows the material component in a
definition. Thus, the definitional matter/form structure is grounded in the ontology of compositional
matter/form structure, and this in turn relies on the role of material as the substrate for generation. And
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thirdly, I return to interpret Aristotle’s Met. Z.10 invocation of “intelligible material” in light of these
remarks on compositional generation. It is shown that mathematical objects are generated by an
entelecheia of the intellect in a particular encounter with sensible objects. The sensible objects are
intelligible material, as Aristotle’s text reads; this claim is explained by casting sensible particulars in the
role of material substrate for the generation of mathematical objects—intelligible material. Though the
later passage from Met. H.6 does indeed employ the phrase “hulê noêtê” in conjunction with
definitional materiality (there denoted as “hulê tou logou”), Aristotle does not intend to conflate the
two. The form/matter definitional structure of mathematical objects depends upon the form/matter
compositional structure in individual mathematical objects, and it is intelligible material that grounds
this compositional structure for mathematicals. In conclusion, I discuss the implications for this theory of
intelligible material upon the interpretation of Aristotle’s mathematical ontology. Aristotle’s
“abstraction” cannot be a solution to the problem of mathematical object ontology; it is used, rather, to
state part of the problem.

Owen Goldin, Marquette University,
Owen Goldin@Marquette.edu
“Aristotle and the Pythagorean Opposites”
Aristotle presents the Physics as an inquiry into principles (arkhai) of nature. The first book leads to the
conclusion that there are three principles of change: two contraries and a substrate. What does arkhē
mean in this context? What are the demands that a satisfactory account of principles, in this sense,
must meet? One way of approaching this question is to consider at what Aristotle has to say of the
nature of accounts given by his predecessors. Unnamed Pythagoreans anticipated Aristotle in taking the
principles of natural things to be correlated contraries, linked through causal relations. In De Caelo 2.2
Aristotle criticizes the Pythagoreans on the grounds that their appeal to contraries does not distinguish
between which are prior and which are posterior. I here argue that Aristotle's point is that the
Pythagoreans did not distinguish between causal priority and posteriority in their explanations. Certain
principles are more causally basic than others, and explanations, in the natural sciences, and elsewhere,
must make that apparent. The theory of demonstration presented within the Posterior Analytics is at
least in part intended to show how explanations are to be structured to allow this to be so. I conclude by
showing how, even though the account of the three principles of change developed in Physics 1 is not
easily integrated with the Aristotle's syllogistic, it in principle is not subject to the objection that Aristotle
raises against the Pythagorean appeal to contraries as explanatory principles.

Rebecca Goldner, Villanova University,
rebecca.goldner@villanova.edu
“More Than Ethical: Aristotle on the Mean”
This paper argues that there is an overlooked and undervalued consistency in Aristotle’s description of
the mean at work throughout the corpus, and that the relationship of the use of the mean in both the
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physical world and in human life is best articulated in de Anima. While the so- called “doctrine of the
mean” remains a critical component of the scholarship on the Nicomachean Ethics, far less attention has
been given its use in the other works, but I argue here that only in looking to the physical and
physiological uses of the term and, in particular, to de Anima (where sensation-- the very mark of animal
life-- depends on a principle of receiving form without matter, a principle designated a mean), can we
fully appreciate its use in the Ethics. Aristotle’s use of the mean in the psychology is deeply intertwined
with his understanding of the mean and the intermediate (meson and mesotes, respectively) operative
in the physical universe, and I claim that even in the Ethics and the Politics the mean is indicative of the
ability of a being to hold itself in and consistently return to a state of equilibrium, one achieved as an
appropriate, though not exact, proportion of contraries.
Thus, I investigate various articulations of mesotes/meson in order to uncover the relationship between
texts and to draw out, if not an identity, a resonance produced by use of the same term across the
corpus, a resonance that suggests that life in its various forms (and inclusive of thought and
communication) seeks a type of harmony- a balance or equilibrium- in the encounter of one thing to
another. Looking in particular at de Caelo and Generation and Corruption , we find that the heavens are
organized such that there is eternal motion around a center or middle point, and in the sublunary world,
we find that all perceptible bodies enact their existence as a middle point or a mean between the
elemental transformations that bring them into existence and destroy them. Everything, from the
heavens down to the smallest rock on earth, is what it is because it bears a relationship to a middle, and,
as every body is an intermediate, perception must be an openness and receptiveness to these
intermediates that allows for awareness of them. Ultimately, I draw attention to how this mean is
enacted or lived by the human subject and I suggest that in our most basic life functions as well as our
highest capacities as humans, we seek this very equilibrium in all of our experiences of the world, be
they perceptual, practical, or social.

Francisco Gonzalez, University of Ottawa,
fgonzal2@uottawa.ca
“Motion or Activity? The Being and Temporality of Life in Aristotle”
As the first cause of motion that is not itself moved, Aristotle’s unmoved mover could be assumed to be,
and often is taken to be, something static and timeless, a Parmenidean being existing in an eternal
present. After all, something incapable of motion, we would assume, is inactive, absolutely present and
self-same: in a word, dead. However, when we read Aristotle’s description of the being of the unmoved
mover, we see it identified with energeia. That the word means here ‘activity’ rather than, as many
translations would have it, some static ‘actuality’ is made clear when Aristotle proceeds to identify the
energeia of the unmoved mover with life and pleasure. But how can something supposed to be
unmoved be actively living and feeling pleasure? How can something lacking any potential (dunamis) be
thus dynamic in its being? How can something eternal be characterized by activities that seem
impossible to conceive of without reference to time? How, finally, can such activity be ousia in the
highest and primary sense of the word? These are the questions the present paper proposes to address
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by way of a reading of Metaphysics Theta 6 1048b18-35, in which a distinction between motion (kinêsis)
and activity (energeia) is explained and defended, as well as through the critique of some recent
interpretations that, among other things, seek to minimize the importance of this text.
Mirzoeva Gulrukhsor , Association of Persian Studies, Tajikistan,
preety_04@rambler.ru
“A Comparison between the Philosophical Presupposition of the Zoroastrian and Muslim Theologies”
This study begins by depicting a prima facie paradox. On the one hand Nietzsche has a very positive view
of Zoroastrianism and a very negative appraisal of Monotheism. On the other hand Muslims take
Zoroastrians- along with Jews and Christian to be people of a (sacred monotheistic book) [ahl-i Kitab].
Next the paper proposes that Nietzsche’s reading emphasizes on the role of free will in Zoroastrianism,
while the Muslims reading emphasizes Zoroaster’s ethics of harmony between reason and an implicit
concept of the “best of all possible world order.” The major difference is that Zoroaster, unlike Muslims
or other monotheists does not assume that there is a conscious God Who is omnipotence. In contrast
according to both Zoroastrian and Nietzsche, the free Good Will to power, is the main source of
realization of the good life-not ascetic worship or blind obedience to a transcendent being.

Khalil Habib, Salve Regina University,
khalil.habib@salve.edu
“The Meaning of Socrates' Asceticism in Aristophanes' Clouds”
One could read the Clouds and conclude that Aristophanes is an esoteric Socratic; that is, a wise poet
who, while viewing nature as indifferent to human flourishing, has (unlike his Socrates) the good grace
and prudence to keep quiet about it. Is this Aristophanes’ deepest criticism of Socrates? This paper
argues not.

Chelsea Harry, Duquesne University,
harryc@duq.edu
“The Meaning of Nous in Physics iv.14”
In Physics iv 11, Aristotle defines time (chronos) as the number (arithmos) of motion (kinesis) with
respect to before and after (219b1-2). In Physics iv 14, Aristotle argues that time is dependent on nous
(223a25). We can say, then, that the number of motion with respect to before and after is dependent on
nous. What might this mean? In this paper, I offer up two arguments in defense of the view that nous
here refers exclusively to the intellective potency of the human soul, thus my claim is that human beings
are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of actual time in Aristotle’s account. I will
discuss in particular the relationship between number (arithmos) and nous in Physics iv 14 and Aristotle’s
account of sensation in De sensu 436a-437a. Namely, I suggest that the existence of number requires
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not only (1) an intellect capable of counting, but also (2) a body by which to sense perceive that which
can be counted.
John Hendrix, University of Lincoln,
jhendrix@rwu.edu
“Philosophy of Intellect in the Long Commentary on the De anima of Averroes”
Averroes or Ibn Rushd was born in Cordoba in 1126 and died in Marrakech in 1198. He was educated in
philosophy, theology, mathematics, medicine, and jurisprudence, and held the office of judge for many
years. He was called "Commentator" for his commenaries on Aristotle, which are mostly known through
Latin translations. In his Long Commentary on the De anima, Averroes posits three separate intelligences
in the anima rationalis or the rational soul: agent intellect or intellectus agens, material or passible
intellect, intellectus possibilis or intellectus passibilis, and speculative intellect, intellectus speculativus,
or actualized or acquired intellect, intellectus adeptus. In the De anima 3.1.5, "there are three parts of
the intellect in the soul; the first is the receptive intellect, the second, the active intellect, and the third is
actual intellection...," that is, speculative or actualized, agent, and material. While material intellect is
"partly generable and corruptible, partly eternal," corporeal and incorporeal, the speculative and agent
intellects are purely eternal and incorporeal. In the De anima 3.1.5, the existence of intelligibles or first
principles in intellect, as they are understood in actualized intellect, "does not simply result from the
reception of the object," the sensible form in sense perception in material intellect, "but consists in
attention to, or perception of, the represented forms...," the cognition of the forms in actualized intellect
wherein they can be understood as intelligibles, which requires both the participation of active intellect
and the motivation of the individual for intellectual development. The goal of intellectual development is
to achieve union with active intellect, the final entelechy, and through this union the highest bliss in life
can be achieved. Such bliss can only be achieved "in the eve of life." All individual material intellects are
capable of some ability to form concepts and abstract ideas at a basic level, but beyond that, intellectual
development varies among individuals according to the level of volition. Complete knowledge of the
material world results in complete unity between the material intellect and the active intellect.

Hyun Höchsmann, New Jersey City University,
hhochsmann@njcu.edu
“Division, Measure and Weaving in the Statesman”
If a crane could speak, he would … oppose men and all other animals to cranes
Plato explains that men, whether they are Athenians or Thracians, are no different from cranes, when
they classify themselves as belonging to one category and group all others on the other side. In place of
this haphazard way of classification which elevates Hellenes and denigrates the others as barbarians,
Plato puts forward the dialectical method as an objective method of division, identification and
classification.
The dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does not set the great above the small, but always
arrives in its own way at the truest result.
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Why does Plato expend what seems an inordinate amount of effort to specify to what class of things an
individual entity belongs and what concept of measure should apply to classes of objects? What is “the
truest result” when the dialectical method is applied to classification in the Statesman? There is political
as well as logical significance in rejecting the division of mankind into Hellenes and barbarians. Plato
points out the absurdity of the pride of Hellenes by placing them in the same category with Phrygians or
Lydians. Plato advocates the impartiality of the dialectical method, which juxtaposes birds with men (as
bipeds), and the king with the bird-catcher. A king and a vermin-destroyer belong to the same class.
Plato’s preoccupation with division and classification in the Statesman has been criticized as being
pedantic and superfluous. But this received view disregards the significance of the processes of division
and classification for the real task of the dialogue: the delineation of the functions of the statesman and
the science of governing the state.
In order to specify what the function of the statesman consists in, Plato first examines what kinds of
individual characteristics are present in the state. Some are temperate but deficient in courage while
others are courageous and effective in action but deficient in temperance. Since both temperance and
courage are necessary in due measure in the true art of the governing the task of the true statesman
consists in weaving the two elements into one to produce the mean between excess and deficiency.
Plato’s aim in classification is not for the sake making distinctions but to delineate the opposites so that
when they are woven together the whole produces the mean exemplifying the harmony of opposites.
Plato’s conception of the science of the statesman as the process of weaving two contrasting strands to a
whole is built on his dialectical method of division and measure.
Plato’s focus on division is essential for clarifying the concepts of measure and the mean in the science of
the statecraft as weaving of opposites into a harmonious whole.
The conception of the just state as built on harmony of the constituents formulated in the Republic
endorses the task of the statesman as a weaver of the divergent characteristics in the state.

Hyun Höchsmann, New Jersey City University,
hhochsmann@njcu.edu
“Zhuangzi on the Politics of the Sage”
Strife is fueled by obstinate adherence to one’s own views (Zhuangzi 26).xxxxxxThe great man does not
harm others in his actions … He recognizes that the right and the wrong are frequently indistinguishable
and that what is small and what is great are frequently indefinable (Zhuangzi 17).xxxxxxThe sage
harmonizes the right and the wrong and rests in the equal action of heaven. This is called following two
paths (Zhuangzi 2).
The central themes in Zhuangzi’s political thought are: we ought to attempt resolving conflicts by
examining the grounds of our own views; to avoid harming others by realizing that our value judgments
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regarding right and wrong are not infallible; and seeking the common ground among opposing claims of
right and wrong. xxxThe right course of action is not that which destroys what is considered to be wrong
but seeking the common ground which is most conducive to establishing harmony. Zhuangzi urges all to
seek common consensus. It is not unquestioning acceptance or compliance with the established point of
view but the ability to resolve conflicts and reach a common understanding which characterizes the way
of the sage.
He was never heard to take the lead but always appeared to be of the same mind as others (Zhuangzi 6).
This conception of political action as requiring the common consensus is supported by Zhuangzi’s view
that knowledge and virtue are constituted by what is held in common.
The work of government should be distributed in accordance with the approval of all (Zhuangzi 26).
It is possible to derive a political philosophy of peace and non-violence from Zhuangzi’s conception of
the good as that which yields rather than that which attacks or retaliates.
In contrast to the optimistic expectation that morality is achieved through vigorous inculcation of virtues
and the belief in the inherent goodness of human nature, Zhuangzi urges that we allow the mind to
become completely objective and impartial as a mirror of reality. Being still as still water, the sage is the
“mirror of heaven and earth.” The sage makes the mind of the people his mind.
The ancient rulers believed that the success of government resided in the people and the failure in
themselves. They attributed what was right to the people and what was wrong to themselves. Therefore,
even when one person lost his life, they withdrew and held themselves responsible. But now it is
different (Zhuangzi 25).
Zhuangzi, without advocating the rule by the people, upholds the democratic ideal of the people
determining what is right. Wrongdoing is caused by insufficiency of resources and unjust rule. The sage
does not look outward for rules and customs to coerce others, but seeks simultaneously the autonomy
of individuals and the common point of view. But how is unity to be achieved, given that we pursue
divergent aims?
Human relations are difficult but there is an order and a pattern. The sage does not oppose human
relations when he encounters them (Zhuangzi 22).

Noel Hubler, Lebanon Valley College,
hubler@lvc.edu
“Plato’s Psychic Motion: Epistemological, cosmological, and practical consequences.”
In the late dialogues, Plato develops a theory of cognition as a form of psychic motion. Although the
consequences of Plato’s anaLysis of cognition as psychic motion extend broadly throughout his late
dialogues, its implications have yet to be studied in detail by modern commentators who have either
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dismissed psychic motion as merely symbolic (Cornford, Annas, and Lee) or have mistaken it for
locomotion (Sedley, Johansen, Kamtekar, and Karfik). The new theory allows Plato to overcome the strict
division between sense and intellect espoused in the middle dialogues. In the middle dialogues, senseperception cannot positively contribute to true understanding, but the senses must be left behind to
come to knowledge of the forms. In the late dialogues, Plato develops a unified theory of cognition,
based on his anaLysis of both sense and understanding as psychic motion. Both sense and intellect are
self-originating, immaterial motions of the soul that conform to their objects, so each displays proper
measure. Plato’s new theory of cognition then allows for a new theory of techne (art or skill). As a
species of knowledge, techne also conforms to measure through the apprehension of its standard and
then moves the body to bring measure into the material realm. Techne combines both an understanding
of formal measure and the ability to bring it to bear in the material realm. Plato’s new theory of techne
serves as a model for both his cosmology and his political theory. So the theory of psychic motion
grounds Plato’s late epistemology, cosmology, and practical theory.

John Humphrey, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University,
jfhumphr@ncat.edu
“Plato’s Republic: The Polis as a Paradigm”
In three previous papers, “Socrates’ Interpretation of His Own Wisdom,” “Socrates and Achilles: A Shift in
Paradigms,” and “Plato’s Paradigm in the Apology of Socrates,” I have been concerned with Plato’s
paradigm of the philosopher as represented in the character of Socrates. In particular, I have examined
what Socrates means when he interprets his own wisdom by claiming that the god used his name in
order to make him a model or a pattern [paradeigma], “as if he would say, ‘That one of you, O human
beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, has become cognizant that in truth he is worth nothing with respect
to wisdom’” (Ap. 23a-b). Considering Socrates as the paradigm of the philosopher, led to an investigation
of Socrates’ allusion to Achilleus, the paradigmatic warrior in Plato’s Apology of Socrates (Ap. 28b-29a),
where Socrates implies that the philosopher, the paradigmatic rational individual, should replace the
warrior, the paradigmatic individual governed by thymos. This study raised the question: just what sort
of paradigm is Socrates, the paradigm of the philosopher? Juxtaposing Socrates to Achilles, the
paradigmatic warrior, on the one hand, and Oedipus, who for Sophocles is the unenviable paradigm of
the human because he enjoys only fleeting happiness, I argued that Socrates turns everything on its
head; instead of suffering his fate, he embraces it and thus becomes enviable because in the face of the
limits of human finitude, he presents us with a paradigm of a life guided by and subject to reason – a
noble human life that, by embracing the human condition, transcends the human condition.
In this paper, I return to Plato’s conception of a “paradigm,” however, not as it appears in The Apology of
Socrates, but as it is found in Plato’s Republic. In Book V, Glaucon has been pressing Socrates to tell him
whether the city is possible; Socrates, who by his own admission has been “loitering” (472a), finally asks:
“Weren’t we … also making a pattern [paradeigma] in speech of a good city?” (472d-e). I shall argue that
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in Plato’s Republic, the city in speech is a paradigm, and that, according to Socrates, it is a paradigm
absent in the life of the evil individual, but that in the life of the good person it is a pattern according to
which he or she may model his or her life. Focusing on paradigms, then, raises questions about their
ontological and epistemic status. A paradigm, for example is not a form (eidos), yet a paradigm seems to
have some features similar to those of the forms. Additionally, focusing on paradigms raises questions
about our understanding of Socrates and the philosophic task. Indeed, we must seriously consider the
possibility that the Apology of Socrates is not really Socrates’ attempt to defend himself from the charges
brought against him, but a defense of the life devoted to philosophy, and that the Republic is not
intended to found an ‘ideal polis’ as so many have claimed, but an attempt to defend the life devoted to
justice – the philosophic life.

Timothy Huson, St. Louis University,
husontc95@yahoo.com
“Aristotle’s Teleia philia as Principle of Political Critique”
I will first explore a circularity issue in the standard rational and state-teleological framework of
Aristotle’s political theory, and then show how Aristotle’s idea of teleia philia, understood in the context
of the sense of fairness or equity (to epieikes), enables a political critique grounded outside of the
education institutions of any particular regime.
In Aristotle’s political thought the individual is understood in terms of the state from which he/she
receives an education that instills the moral archai that provide the fundamental sense of good and bad,
just and unjust. These moral principles are in turn the basis for the particular form the state takes, since
this form must be appropriate to the matter, the makeup of the citizenry, and thus a potential circularity
can be discerned. This teleological relation between form and matter, where the state instills in the
individual the telos and ethical archai, internalized as desire for the good, is also the main principle in
Aristotle’s own assessment of various governments – providing the framework for assessing the object
studied and being involved in instilling in Aristotle his own intuition of the good. While assessing the
good government involves a rational principle (in terms of numerical and proportional equality), this
must be relative to the corresponding matter, the citizenry. So initially the socially acquired sense of
right and wrong and the rational calculation of equality would seem to be the chief principles for
critiquing a state – both for theoretical work and for political action. The potential of a circularity (and a
vicious relativity) appears in that the essential sense of the good is acquired by influence of the
particular regime that regulates the education system that instills that sense of good in both the citizenry
and the researcher.
I argue that, though he does not present it as such, Aristotle intuitively provides the key response to this
circularity issue with his understanding of philia as an extra-rational and extra-political sense of justice
that runs against the grain of his basic principles of state teleology and rationally determined political
justice. I connect this with Claudia Baracchi’s suggestion that perfect friendship is a sort of extra-legal
justice, while avoiding a potential circularity of making the state a precondition of philia by drawing on
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Ronna Burger’s emphasis of the independence of friendship. To understand philia for this purpose,
taking philia as a bond of association, I must distinguish two differentiae for grasping its more chief sense
(to kuriōteron): a private bond (as opposed to public) and a pure bond (as opposed to self-interested). In
the latter sense, Aristotle’s teleia philia has its proper political place – independently of and even running
against or correcting the rational concept of justice – as the sense of justice and fairness between
citizens in the equitable or fair person (ho epieikēs) and the discretion of a fair or equitable ruler or
judge. This principle could also be employed, I think, as an extra-political basis of political criticism, both
in theory and in practice.

Lisa Indraccolo, URPP Asia and Europe, University of Zurich, Switzerland,
lisa.indraccolo@uzh.ch
“Of Stones and Horses - Reading the Gongsun Longzi in Terms of Concrete Universals”
The Warring States period (475-221 B.C.) is often considered the age of the maximum flourishing of early
Chinese politico-philosophical debate, which is best represented in those works that are traditionally
categorized under the name of “masters texts” (zishu). However, Classical Chinese philosophical texts are
often accused of being vague and extemporaneous, lacking a solid theoretical framework, a hodgepodge
of commonsensical - and at times even nonsensical - arguments glued together by the later tradition.
This is clearly a misreading of the specific modes of argument construction encountered in Classical
Chinese texts. Not only do they provide evidence of the existence of a lively rhetorical tradition, but are
vehicles for the exposition and the discussion of epistemologically well-grounded theories, though these
are rarely explicitly expounded, but have to be extrapolated from the context through a close and
attentive reading (Lu Xing 1998; Li Chenyang 1999, Wardy 2004).
From this point of view, the Gongsun Longzi, a collection of dialogues, speeches and essays named after
and traditionally attributed to a homonymous, yet fictive persuader (Csikszentmihalyi and Nylan 2003;
Smith 2003; Graham 1986), is usually considered one of the most puzzling and challenging texts to make
sense of. Though expressed in some cases in a fluid dialogic thrust and counter-thrust style, as is the case
with the two chapters considered here (the Jianbai Lun and the Baima Lun), the arguments discussed
present a meditated, coherent and progressive exposition, and turn out to be based on a logically sound
reasoning. I will analyse in detail the “hard and white stone” (jianbai shi) and the famous “white
horse”(baima) arguments, after which the two dialogues in the collection are named. I will argue that it
is possible to deduce and to delineate a whole theory of universals starting from these two examples,
and to explain how sensitive perception and sense data are supposed to interact with our conception of
objects in the world as theorized in the Gongsun Longzi.
In particular, in order to explain how qualities can be locally “preserved” (zang), perceivable and
recognizable within the particular object to which they are temporarily attached and in which they find
themselves concretized, and at the same time be “preserved in themselves” (zizang), I will propose an
interpretation of qualities in terms of “concrete universals”, borrowing a mathematical definition,
whereby ‘concrete universal’ designates “an object that has the property and has it in such a universal
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sense that all other objects with the property resemble or participate in that paradigmatic or archetypal
instance” (Ellerman 1988, p. 6; see also Acton 1936 and 1937).
This approach not only contributes a new perspective on the Gongsun Longzi, unravelling the sound
logical reasoning underneath its paradoxical formulations, but also considerably improves our overall
understanding of the text, shedding new light on some obscure passages.

John Inglis, University of Dayton,
inglis@notes.udayton.edu
“On the Eternity of the World: Moneta of Cremona, Maimonides, and Aquinas”
In regard to whether the world is eternal, Bonaventure raises the tone of the discussion in his
commentary on the Sentences by calling his opponents demented and foolish. Yet he does not name the
opponents. Who might these unnamed opponents be? Richard Dales claims in his history on the issue of
the eternity of the world that there is no reason to think that Bonaventure is in debate with individuals
of his own day. He understands Bonaventure’s opponents to be the adversaries of Augustine living eight
hundred years before: “But in all of this there is nothing to indicate that Bonaventure’s opponents are
contemporary theologians or philosophers. In fact, although he draws on a variety of Greek and Arabic
sources, his opponents are Augustine’s contemporaries” (Dales 1990 95-96). According to Dales,
Bonaventure singles out the opponents of Augustine for abuse: “Bonaventure becomes abusive of his
long-dead opponents. . .”.
My argument is that widening our scope beyond the canonical philosophers and theologians allows us to
identify Bonaventure’s contemporaries as Cathars and that this adds complexity to our picture of the
Latin mining of Arabic and ancient philosophy. For example, the logician Moneta of Cremona appears to
have been the first in northern Italy to put Maimonides to use and he did so in order to answer Cathars
in regard to the eternity of the world. Arabic philosophy offered a conceptual language for discussing the
origin of creation. The presentation focuses on Moneta of Cremona, Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas
on the eternity of the world in order to consider an example where an interdisciplinary approach
deepens the reconstruction of specific arguments.

Cristina Ionescu, The Catholic University of America,
ionescu@cua.edu
“Dialectical Method and Myth in Plato's Statesman”
The Statesman begins the search for the nature of statesmanship by means of a dialectical method
which proceeds by dividing a comprehensive kind into species, and continues this way at several levels,
until it identifies the specific difference of the kind searched for. After a first attempt along these lines,
this methodical approach is interrupted by a change in style that seems at least at first difficult to fit with
it, a myth about cosmic reversals, much unlike the pedestrian considerations developed up to this point.
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Once the myth is told, the discussion returns to using the method of division through to the end. We are
left to wonder about the role of this mythical intermezzo in the unity of the dialogue.
The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between the myth and the dialectical method. I will argue
that the two are significantly interwoven, the myth contributing to the employment of the dialectical
method by providing the main guidelines for its successful application and suggesting reasons why it may
fail on the occasions when it does so. While collection and division can be applied in various ontological
horizons, the specific framework in which we apply them makes all the difference in terms of the cuts
and distinctions that will stand out as natural and/or artificial. It is this framework that the myth reveals
to us.
Beyond the veil of metaphor, the myth proposes an ontological model in four terms: the Demiurge,
Forms, particulars, and a site of complete indetermination. The Demiurge acts as cause that harmonizes
the two periods of rotation; Forms are “the most divine things of all” (269d), unchanging and constant;
the universe as a whole and all of its contents are particulars fashioned by the Demiurge in imitation of
Forms; finally, the site of complete indetermination, the ultimate stage of disintegration and chaos, is
referred to as “boundless sea of unlikeness” (273d).
The paper defends its above-mentioned thesis by arguing for the following points: a) the myth accounts
for the importance of making cuts at the natural joints to delimit real classes and not mere parts, and
thus advising against restricting the method to bisective division; b) it provides the ontological
framework within which divisions and collections are carried out in search for the statesman; c) it
provides the basis for a hierarchical understanding of reality; d) it offers, in the persona of the Demiurge,
a paradigm for the statesman, as harmonizer, as shepherd, as weaver, as doctor, as steersman and as
moral reformer dealing with cosmic maladies and imbalance.

Parovakhon Jamsehdov, Tajikistan Academy of Science,
pjam07@mail.ru
“Cosmogony and Ethics of Classical Zoroastrian Philosophical Theology”
This study is an investigation of two specific themes in Zoroastrian philosophical
theology : (i) a comparison of the cosmogony of Plotinus and Zoroastrianism with a
focus on the notion of time in light of the later development of Zoroastrian tradition
in Zurvanism (which like Heidegger relates “being” with “time”) and (ii) the ethics
of “pragmatic truth of the good will” constructed from the notions of “asha [arête,
kamal] and “pendar-i neek” in the light of Nietache’s modification of Zoroastrian
ethics.

Jolanta Jaskolowska, Westwood College Chicago Loop,
jolaj@att.net
“The Account of Semantics in On Interpretation and Aristotle's Overall Theory of Language”
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What is the relation of the very condensed discussion of semantics at the beginning of On Interpretation
to Aristotle's overall understanding of language? In On Interpretation 4, Aristotle states that the
consideration of non-assertoric statements is a part of the studies of the arts of poetry and rhetoric.
Seen in this way, almost all of Aristotle's account of the philosophy of language takes place in the Poetics
and the Rhetoric, rather than in On Interpretation. Following a tradition leading back to the Neoplatonic
curriculum of the 5th and 6th centuries, we have a tendency to assign a priority to Aristotle's account of
the assertion as the basis of logic in his overall account of language. Instead, I argue that the account of
semantics is only a small part of Aristotle's overall philosophy of language, which is mainly found in his
accounts of lexis in the Poetics and Rhetoric. In contrast, Aristotle must indicate in On Interpretation the
elements of his epistemology that support truth conditions for assertions because his account there
must address both Platonic and Sophistic objections to our ability to grasp the truth in language (logos)
at all. In conclusion, the account of semantics in On Interpretation addresses the Platonic and Sophistic
accounts of language just as the Rhetoric and Poetics address and criticize both Plato's and Gorgias'
accounts of poetry and rhetoric.

Haewon Jeon, Northwestern University,
haewon@u.northwestern.edu
“The Moral Capacity of the Producers in Plato’s Republic”
According to many interpreters, Plato in the Republic denies that a non-philosopher can possess virtue in
a meaningful way. I argue against such interpretations. In particular, I focus on whether Plato thinks the
producers of the kallipolis can satisfy one requirement of virtue that has a great intuitive appeal – the
requirement that a virtuous person should to have right sorts of motivation for her actions.
My opponents’ view can be summarized as the following. They argue that no matter how justly the
producers behave outwardly, they can never have the right motivation for doing so. Such interpretations
arise from the reading that for Plato, one cannot be ruled by the reasoning part of the soul unless one
has the capacity and desire to do philosophy. Producers have neither the desire nor the capacity to do
philosophy, so they cannot be ruled by reason. Instead, they are ruled by the appetitive part and are
only capable of appreciating appetitive pleasures. This means that they cannot appreciate immaterial
things like harmonious soul and virtue except as means to some appetitive good. Surely Plato would not
consider such people genuinely virtuous.
To present an argument against such readings, I divide my paper into three parts. In Part 1, I argue that
Plato’s conception of psychological ruling does not require one to pursue philosophy to be ruled by
reason. To rule the soul, the reasoning part only has to satisfy two conditions: (1) it has to have a correct
belief about what is the most advantageous good for the soul as a whole, and (2) it has to have enough
control over the other soul parts to actually carry out its plans for getting that good. In Part 2, I examine
the way Plato opens and closes the dialogue to describe the sort of virtuous producer he might have
envisioned. Through his depictions of the old man Cephalus and the Myth of Er, Plato tells us that non-
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philosophers can satisfy the two above conditions by recognizing the importance of psychic harmony. In
Part 3, I argue that the producers of kallipolis cannot be ruled by appetite if they are to behave the way
Socrates envisions them to. If they indeed are ruled by appetite, they will run into the same sorts of
problems that the faulty cities and souls of Book 8 and 9 do. Therefore, Plato does not have a choice but
to permit his producers to have “virtuous motivations” – motivations that are worthier than some bodily
goods at least.

Brian Johnson, Fordham University,
brjohnson@fordham.edu
“The Definition of Aristotelian Intellectual Virtue”
"What is the species of intellectual virtue?" Aristotle defines virtues of character as "mean states" and
he apparently believes that virtues of intellect are "states" but it seems that he never quite gets around
to telling us their species. While it prima facie appears that Aristotle should define intellectual virtue as
"states concerned with truth", that definition will not work. First, it fails to parallel the definition of
character virtues (which is entirely "internal", i.e. it picks out features of the hexeis themselves. If virtues
of character were defined "externally," they would have to be "states concerned with certain types of
actions"). Second, some of the lesser discussed intellectual virtues do not fit the "concerned with truth"
model. E.g. euboulia does not seem to be about a body of knowledge but rather a skill of deliberation;
epieikia is about the right discrimination, specifically about getting the right correction of legal justice.
That seems more like a special act of intellectual perception than a kind of truth. In line with that, I will
be arguing that the best way to distinguish character virtue from intellectual virtue is that character
virtue is a scalar state whereas intellectual virtue is nonscalar. In turn, this difference has important
implications for how we train ourselves to have each set of virtues.

Dana Johnson, Duquesne University,
dana.jo@gmail.com
“The Erotic Ascent: Plato and Plotinus on Beauty and Pedagogy”
Philosophical erōs gives rise to and sustains the ascent of the soul. Philosophical erotics is the soul's
productive activity that requires dialectical pursuit of wisdom. Ascent is the productive activity of
dialectic reasoning proceeding correctly; the soul flourishes when dialectical reasoning is paired with
erōs. Philosophical erōs transforms endoxic longing into an even more frenzied passion for truth, which
climaxes during contemplation of beauty itself.
In Plato’s Symposium Diotima characterizes love as the activity of “giving birth in beauty, whether in
body or in soul.” Philosophy and philosophers play the role of the midwife who aids in the birth of
beautiful ideas. The essence of Diotmia's scala amoris is the pedagogical push towards a turning from
the body to the intellect. The educator (paiderastēs) activates passionate desire for knowledge within
the pedagogical relationship. The transformed erotic desire longs for the beautiful (to kalon). Love
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inspires the virtuous and gradual ascent of the individual's psychē toward the object of desire--beauty as
equated with the good (to agathon).
Socrates criticizes the erastês-erômenos (lover-beloved) relationships of his fellow symposiasts because
it creates a duality between education and eroticism. The educational-erotic relationship should not
reflect the duality of perceived reality: corporeal and incorporeal, sensible and intelligible. Rather, the
educational-erotic should reflect the ladder of love: one ultimate aim that undergoes a gradual process
of transformation closer and closer to beauty itself.
Plotinus' commentary on Plato's Symposium “On Beauty” from the Enneads identifies the desire for
beauty as a way to understand the moral drive: “Labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease
chiselling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendour of virtue, until you
shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine.” Individuals are drawn to
beautiful objects. Plotinus claims the moral imperative is to subtract the material from beautiful objects,
thus yearning for beauty itself, an activity of ascent aiming at the divine, the One. The spark of the divine
resides within the intellectual unconscious of the human soul. Turning inward leads to an understanding
of the aim and source of erōs. Yearning to return to the source, the rational human soul, also known as
the intellectual unconscious, works to shuffle off the material world by a turn inward closer to unity with
the One. Love makes possible both emanation and return, descent and ascent.
Love is learning towards wisdom. Human reason accesses truth through the activity of philosophical
erotics - a passionate love resulting in ascent as the virtuous life. A moral (correct) education involves
both dialectical reasoning and philosophical erotics in order to gradually ascend and participate in
beauty all the more. Without love, the beauty of wisdom is impossible.
Anton Kabeshkin, Johns Hopkins University Department of Philosophy,
akabeshkin@gmail.com
“Thumos in Plato’s Republic”
In this paper I consider the essence of the “spirited” part or thumos in Plato’s tripartition of the soul in
the Republic. I analyze the official argument for the tripartition in book IV, the description of the
“timocratic man” in book VIII and Plato’s discussion of the ideal city denizens’ education in books II-III.
The argument leads to the conclusion that thumos is essentially a part of the soul which is concerned
with socially inculcated values and shaped by social interactions. In defense of this interpretation I
confront the widespread view of thumos as “good-dependent” or “good-sensitive” part of the soul. I
argue that my interpretation has two important advantages over the rival one. First, it has more
explanatory power, being able to account for oddities in the description of the timocratic man, being
supported by Plato’s discussion of the physical and “musical” education of children and shedding
additional light on Plato’s attitude towards art. Second, it allows to explain the spirited part’s conformity
to the councils of reason in some cases and its divergence from them in other cases, rather than to
postulate it as a brute fact, as a rival interpretation essentially does. Additionally, this interpretation both
supports and is supported by recent research on Plato’s psychology which is primarily done on the basis
of dialogues other than the Republic.
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This interpretation of thumos affects the more general question of how exactly did Plato carve up the
soul, and what is the principle of this division. Based on the understanding of spirit as the socially
malleable and socially concerned part of the soul I will argue that both Plato’s texts and some general
considerations support another division: that into the part of the soul with relatively rigid desires, the
part with socially malleable desires and the part which is capable of sophisticated reasoning and whose
desires arise as a result of such reasoning.

Shalahudin Kafrawi, Hobart and Smith Colleges,
skafrawi@gmail.com
“Application of Logic of Intentionality and Sacred Religious Writings”
This study begins with the medieval tripartite interpretations of medieval theology into formal theology,
philosophy and mysticism with reference to the systems of Averroes, Tusi and Mulla Sadra. Next, it
clarifies the salient features of the application of hermeneutics to religious text. In its conclusion, this
study clarifies the salient uses of notions of “self-reference” and “intentionality” for clarification of
delineation between the languages of medieval nature mysticism and formal theology.
Vahid Karimi, United Nations,
svkarimi@gmail.com
“Contemporary Significance of Medieval Political Philosophy of Proxy War in Tusi and Machiavelli and
Ancient Study of Arts of War”
This presentation clarifies the logic and contemporary applications of a twofold model of “proxy war”
embedded in both ancient (e.g. The Art of War attributed to Sun Tzu) and later pre-modern literatures
(e.g. Machiavelli’s The Prince, and N. Tusi political writings). Finally this inquiry questions the universal
applicability of political philosophies to different historical epochs.
Malcolm Keating, University of Texas at Austin,
c.malcolm.keating@gmail.com
“How Can I Know What You Mean? Implication, Inference, and Dhvani”
Given a sentence like "The fog comes on little cat feet", how is a hearer to know what is meant in such a
novel and poetic context? The dhvani tradition in Indian aesthetics claims that much of what is meant
can only be obtained by the sensitive, skillful hearer, through a process called "suggestion" which is not
reducible to inference or any verbal operation such as denotation, metaphor, or metonymy. Writing in
response to this view, Mukula Bhaṭṭa, in his Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā ("The Fundamentals of the
Communicative Function"), argues for an inferentialist account of what is meant by speakers using, for
instance, novel metaphors. While he admits the relation between a sentence token and an utterance
may not be instantly understood (jhaṭiti), he argues that this relation can be determined by reflection
(vicāraṇayā). To explain this process, he relies upon presumption, or arthāpatti, using a broadly Gricean
account of how implicatures may be constructed when literal meanings are blocked. He faces a similar
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problem as Grice, however, since there often seem to be multiple candidates for implicatures for a given
sentence token. How do we know which one(s) the speaker intend(s)? This is one reason the dhvani
theorists think it is impossible to apply inferential reasoning to determine what is suggested by a
sentence token: we would never have disagreements about what is meant, since one need only to
mechanically apply inferential rules. However, Mukula's response does not require that we wholly
abandon the requirement of aesthetic skill, simply that we can justify our judgment about meanings by
appealing to some problem in accepting the literal meaning. We must be able to work backwards to
make explicit what skillful hearers rely upon tacitly in their comprehension of poetic metaphors.

Farrukh Khudoidodov, Tajik Academy of Social Sciences,
farukh1984@mail.ru
“Philosophical AnaLysis of Logic of Categories in N. Tusi’s Principles of Deduction (al-Asas-i Iqtibas)’”
Since Aristotle, some logicians that categories as “highest predicates” are themselves subject of
philosophical investigation; for others categories as tools for philosophical analyses. Following Avicenna
(11th Century), N. Tusi(13th Century) argues for a pragmatic intermediate position that categories may be
used as a set of meta-language concepts for classification of terns; but syntactical distinctions of the
categories are essential for construction of a systematic ontology. In support of my interpretation of
Tusi’s logic, I shall distribute copies of the first English translation of key passages from Tusi’s celebrated
Principles of Deduction (al-Asas-i Iqtibas)’ –the most extensive logic text in Farsi language.

Rodmon King, Hobart and William Smith Colleges,
king@hws.edu
“Definition and Signification in Aristotle's On Interpretation and Posterior Analytics”
In the opening chapters of On Interpretation, Aristotle discusses the signification of linguistic phenomena
including names and verbs. Interestingly nowhere in these chapters does Aristotle discuss definition. In
the Posterior Analytics II, Aristotle appeals to signification while developing an account of scientific
inquiry. However, Aristotle does not directly connect this discussion with his investigation in On
Interpretation. We are left with a puzzle regarding the exact relationship between Aristotle account of
linguistic signification in On Interpretation and the account(s) of definition in the Analytics.
In this paper I explore this relationship and I argue that the types of definitions presented in Posterior
Analytics explain some of the (seemingly) odd things Aristotle claims about signification. In addition, I
contend that the account of signification developed in On Interpretation supplies more robust
understanding of real and nominal definitions when applied to the discussion in the Posterior Analytics.

Achim Koeddermann, SUNY Oneonta,
koeddea@yahoo.com
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“A Comparison of Shi`a and Medieval Christian Perspective on "Just War"
This paper compares the Shi`a and Medieval Christian criteria of a "just war". Its foci include: (i) mutual
concerns on the protection and the sacredness of the lives of civilians in armed conflict; (ii) different
doctrines of "jihad" in philosophical theology; (iii) Muslim and Christian underlying premises of a
collectivist view of a global person; and (iv) complexities on construction of a universal trans-cultural
theory of just war.

Taneli Kukkonen, University of Otago and University of Jyväskylä,
taneli.kukkonen@otago.ac.nz
“Al-Ghazali on Religion and Selfish Reason”
Al-Ghazali's understanding of religious tolerance has received a fair deal of scrutiny and even fame in
recent years. As outlined in his famous treatise demarcating The Decisive Criterion between Religion and
Hidden Apostasy, al-Ghazali advocates an utmost cautious attitude when it comes to hurling accusations
of unbelief or heresy. For al-Ghazali, only the clear and explicit denial of God's unity or Muhammad's
mission count as reliable--therefore punishable--manifestations of unbelief.
Less attention has been paid to al-Ghazali's account of the birth of empirical religions as so many
deviations from the correct faith and straight path of Islam. Yet this is plainly a point of interest: not only
does it tie in with the Islamic theme of Jews and Muslims falsifying their Scriptures, but it also cuts to the
heart of al-Ghazali's idiosyncratic anthropology. Given that God is all-powerful and supremely
benevolent, and that humanity is created with a natural desire to contemplate the divine countenance,
how is it that people ever go wrong in their worship and belief? It turns out that al-Ghazali has a
reasonably well worked out theory of human fallibility, within which he can then situate a working
hypothesis concerning both the genesis of the various religious traditions and their surprising tenacity.
Misguided and mistaken religion goes against the very grain of reality and as such might be expected to
be weeded out by the testimony of our senses: however, al-Ghazali's keen awareness of what I deign to
call the social construction of the self leads him to recognize how people may hang on to their misplaced
evaluations against all evidence. This has implications as well for what al-Ghazali thinks are the real
prospects for religious reform.

Farangiz Kurbansho, St Petersburg University, The Russian Federation
pjam07@mail.ru
“Global Framework of Islamic Political Philosophy”
This paper attends to the trans-national, global framework of Islamic political philosophy. It begins by
clarification of a vision of human beings as essentially being citizens of the same globe, with accidental
racial, gender, religious features. Next, the presentation focuses on a dialectical perspective of history in
different époques, all leading to the unity of humanity. Finally the paper compares the global framework

Abstracts, SAGP/SSIPS 2012, Page 38 of 75

September 17, 2012

of Islamic political theory with classical cases of individualism and their applicability to the present global
village. There will an emphasis on political theories of al-Farabi and ibn Khaldun.
Maggie Labinski, Loyola University Chicago,
saraballae@gmail.com
“The Rooster and The Hen: Augustine's Philosophy of Education”
The goal of this paper is to explore Augustine’s use of bird imagery within the context of his philosophy
of education.
To this end, I first (1) examine the appearance of the rooster within De ordine. I argue that the rooster
not only evokes the dialogues of the rhetoricians but, more importantly, it furthers the interlocutors’
discussion of the pedagogical function of reason (ratio). Next (2), I analyze the image of the hen within
De catechizandis rudibus. I argue that the hen not only evokes the Christian bible but, more importantly,
it furthers Augustine’s description of the pedagogical function of desire (amor). I conclude (3) by
articulating some of the questions these images raise about Augustine’s interest in ‘the animal’ and his
understanding of gender.
My hope is to convince readers that Augustine’s philosophy of education not only addresses classically
Augustinian topics – e.g., the self and his God – but that it reveals some of the ways in which Augustine
saw reflections of these topics within the animal world.

Anna Lannstrom, Stonehill College,
alannstrom@yahoo.com
“The problem with moral gods: Thoughts about the trial of Socrates”
This paper considers the possibility that Socrates was tried and convicted because of his view that the
gods were moral. I will argue that it by itself should not have been enough to motivate the trial because
criticism of the Homeric gods was not that radical in Athens at the time and because the arguments
linking Socrates’ rejection of Homer and Hesiod to the trial oversimplify and misunderstand Greek
religion. However, I maintain that the implications of a belief in moral gods may indeed have been
troubling enough to be a contributing factor. In particular, I will argue that its implications for patriotism
and sacrifice would have been deeply troubling

Susan Levin, Smith College,
slevin@smith.edu
“Technê and Medicine in Plato's Gorgias”
The Gorgias foregrounds an agôn between two fundamentally opposed takes on phusis and eudaimonia,
one centered on the fostering of humans' absolute well-being, the other on an unbounded pursuit of
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whatever one's urges and practical goals happen to be at a given time. The philosophical frame for the
conduct of this dispute is the dialogue's articulation of a highly normative construction of technê. On the
Gorgias' account, many so-called technai (e.g., rhetoric, cookery) are unmasked as empeiriai (mere
"knacks"); only those select endeavors meeting the dialogue's standards for a genuine technê warrant
human beings' pursuit. While substantial depiction of the political technê--supreme due to its exclusive
focus on the welfare of the highest good, namely, soul--must await later dialogues, core elements of the
tack to be taken are evident.
In the Gorgias, medicine fares well when the comparison-point is rhetoric, cookery, and other practices
of that ilk. Yet the very same criteria that warrant medicine's lauding there also show how its occupation
with health, to which pursuit reflection on soul is incidental, rests on views of human nature and
flourishing strongly at odds with Plato's own. Seen from this vantage point, the Gorgias not only debuts
Plato's highly normative technê framework but also sets the course for his more openly critical stance
toward medicine in the Symposium and Republic.

Donald Lindenmuth, The Pennsylvania State University,
dcl1@psu.edu
“The Treatment of Eros in Plato's Symposium and Phaedrus”
Both Plato's Symposium and Phaedrus deal with eros in relation to the arts of rhetoric and poetry. Both
dialogues arise because of Phaedrus, who especially likes listening to rhetorical speeches, enjoys poetic
diction, and seeks the advantages of love without any disadvantage. Many commentators have regarded
the treatment that eros receives by Socrates in the Phaedrus as superior to that of the Symposium. I
argue that the speeches can be interpreted as complementary due to the composite nature of Phaedrus,
who is drawn both to rhetoric and poetry.
The Phaedrus is different from the Symposium in that the famous palinode of Socrates is not simply a
refutation of the other speeches but specifically is a refutation of Socrates' previous speech in which he
praised non-loving over loving, which itself is a superior formulation of Lysias' speech. The similarity and
difference of Phaedrus' speech in the Symposium and Lysias' speech in the Phaedrus provides the basis
for the difference of Socrates' major speeches in each of the two dialogues. Phaedrus' character also
provides the need for Socrates to speak rhetorically and to provide a philosophical evaluation of
speaking and writing in the latter part of the dialogue. This positioning of speeches by Socrates is
possible in the Phaedrus rather than the Symposium because Socrates can concentrate upon Phaedrus
independent of all the other speakers in the Symposium.
Socrates' palinode involves recollection in place of climbing the stages to Beauty in the Symposium; it
deals with the particular character of the beloved with a typology of character rather than simply beauty
itself. The palinode also rest upon an account of soul as self-motion and a mythic elaboration of that
motion, neither of which are found in Socrates' speech in the Symposium. The soul appears as a
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montrous combination of parts, while Socrates' speech in the Symposium rest upon eros as desiderative
and more easily reduciable to body.
Eros in the Phaedrus is reciprocal and visualized in terms of what a lover interprets as a likeness to
himself. Such love is more visionary than generative; it doesn't produce another like oneself but sees
another as oneself. Eros is a god rather than a daemon and the gods themselves are independent and
not in need of another god to complete themselves. The Symposium is more oriented to the body while
the Phaedrus is oriented to the soul. While the Symposium is largely a series of rhetorical exercises, the
Phaedrus involves a distancing rom the speeches it contains but, because that stance is not wholly
explainable by what we are given explicitly in the dialogue, we reader are required to hold the dialogue
together by reflection upon the complex nature of Socrates' interlocutor.

Tatiana Litvin, St.Petersburg State University,
littatiana@gmail.com
“The Concept of Time by St. Augustine and Its Phenomenological Interpretation”
In my paper I analyze the concept of time in Augustine's Confessions and the epistemological
background of ‘distentio animi’. The main aspects of the philosophy of time - memory, an internal word,
the correlation of time and eternity, I consider from viewpoint of the phenomenological interpretation.
The sensation of time, the anaLysis of presence, the perception of past and future constitute an
anthropological idea of consciousness of time provided in the twentieth century by Husserl as a scheme
of temporality of thought. The theory of Augustine, which includes both Neoplatonism and Christianity,
demonstrates understanding of the nature of time and subjectivity, the methodological potential of
medieval philosophy to contemporary philosophical reflection.

Yihong Liu, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing PRC,
yihongliucn@yahoo.com
“Sufi Mystical and other Persian Elements in Classics of Chinese Islamic Philosophical Tradition”
This paper proffers an account of Persian dimension of Islam in China from the
Introduction of Islam in China (616-18) (i) by Sad ibn abi Waqqas, Travels of Persians to China in 637,
by Sa`ad ibn Abi Waqqas with three Sahabas--namely Suhayla Abuarja, Uwais al-Qarni (594-657), and
Hassan ibn Thabit (554-674)--as well as immigration of Persian artists and intellectuals to China during
the Mongols rule of China in (1271–1368), and (ii) the philosophical themes of monism of “the unity of
being.” The paper clarifies the philosophical themes such as monistic ontology of “unity of being (alWahdat al-Wuhud),” and “hermeneutic ethics of way (Dao, Tariqa)” of specific Chinese texts in Sufism. A
focus is on Jami’s vision of Persian Sufism, and the translation of his views in Chinese texts, namely
Wang Tai-yu (Great Learning of the Pure and Real) and Liu Chih (Displaying the
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Concealment of the Real Realm). Finally the research attends to recent English
translations of these classics by S. Murata.

Deepa Majumdar, Purdue University North Central,
dmajumda@pnc.edu
“Transcendence as Immanence in Heraclitus’ Logos”
Heraclitus, the sage of Ephesus, was known as an “obscure propounder of riddles,” on account of his
cryptic pronouncements. As Aristotle found, Heraclitus did not use the categories of formal logic. As Kirk
and Raven point out, Heraclitus tended to describe the same entity “now as a God, now as a form of
matter, now as a rule of behaviour or principle, which was nevertheless a physical constituent of things.”
Part of his so called “obscurity” lies perhaps in his very notion of the Logos, understood by Kirk and
Raven as the “unifying formula” or “actual constituent of things.” Heraclitus’ Logos, as they put it, is “coextensive with the primary cosmic constituent, fire.” But the most “riddling” aspect of this Logos lies
perhaps in its simultaneous transcendence of discrete things and its immanence “in” them. Even this
immanence is extreme, for it strides both sides of the pairs of opposites. Heraclitus’ Logos thereby
reconciles the apparent opposition between the pairs of opposites.
In this paper, I explore Heraclitus’ Logos for its logically simultaneous transcendence and immanence of
discrete things. I focus, in particular, on Fragments 1, 8, 50, 51, 67, and 90. I then explore the
transcendence of the Logos as a form of immanence, making references to Heraclitus’ unique
cosmology. I conclude that Heralictus is among the most holistic of western thinkers, in his synthesis of
divine transcendence and immanence.

Anne Mamary, Monmouth College,
annem@monmouthcollege.edu
“Geometry in the Humming of the Strings: Pythagorean Means and Plato’s Divided Line”
On a legendary walk, Pythagoras is supposed to have heard musical harmony in a blacksmith’s hammers
ringing against anvils. The story goes that he discovered that the weights of the hammers to be 6, 8, 9,
and 12 and that ratio of one to the other (rather than any absolute weight), produced the intervals that
he heard. Although the story is apocryphal, those ratios, (12:8=3:2; 12:9=4:3; and 12:6=2:1) produce the
fifth, the fourth, and the octave, respectively. These numbers and their ratios illustrate the relationships
of the geometric, harmonic and arithmetic means we can discover in the Republic’s divided line.
In this paper, I suggest that Socrates and his friends engage in another legendary walk as they journey
through the Republic and that the divided line might be understood as the dialogue’s diameter, divided
into these three means. I argue that at the dialogue’s arithmetic mean, at the center of our line or
vibrating string, Glaucon faces an aporia of sorts as he confronts the three waves. It is, in its metaphors
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of waves and water, a seething place, as musical intervals are seething places, depending on the
vibrations between.
The sun-line-cave images come not long after the center of the dialogue. As McClain points out, there
are two means in every interval, the arithmetic and the harmonic (15). While the arithmetic mean
produces the octave, the harmonic (or subarithmetic) mean is in the ratio 4:3 or the 4th. At this place in
the dialogue, at its harmonic mean, Socrates encourages Glaucon and his auditors to study geometry
and astronomy in order to turn the eye toward the harmony of the cosmos and the soul toward the
good.
Finally, the geometric mean also appears in Plato’s line “divided in mean and extreme ratio” and
producing the 5th. Along that line or diameter, if we think of the dialogue as a circle, Glaucon and
friends encounter the divided line image at the point at which the dialogue’s diameter is divided long
segment from short Drawing a perpendicular from the diameter to the circumference of the imagined
circle, we encounter the golden mean, a special case of the geometric mean. The line both points
beyond itself as a guide to a musical education and also enacts that very education for those who
journey along its humming string, turning and tuning the soul.
Works Cited
McClain, Ernest G. The Pythagorean Plato: Prelude to the Song Itself. York
Beach, ME: Nicolas-Hays, 1978. Print.

Janne Mattila, University of Helsinki,
janne.mattila@helsinki.fi
“Religious Pluralism and Philosophical Religion in the Ikhwān al-Safā”
The Epistles of the Brethren of Purity (Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Safā’) (ca. 950s-980s) are famously liberal in their
attitude towards the plurality of religious beliefs, whether of the various Islamic sects or other religions.
The doctrinal identity of the group itself has long been a subject of debate, although the majority of
scholars today identify them with the Ismailis. In the context of the Ismaili doctrine of prophetic cycles,
and possibly influenced by al-Fārābī, the Ikhwān adopt a pluralistic view of religion in which the various
prophetic revelations are seen as representations of the same ultimate truth, conveyed to a specific time
and place in history. Unlike for al-Fārābī, for the Ikhwān the concept of religion is not merely a
philosophical abstraction, but they discuss the question of the plurality of religions also in more concrete
terms in the 42. epistle. While tolerant of religious variance, the Ikhwān emphasize the necessity of
religion for salvation, and condemn vehemently those contemporary philosophers whom they accuse to
have renounced religion altogether.
While obviously identifying themselves as Muslims, the Ikhwān’s perception of religion is highly
philosophical. They identify different levels of exoteric and esoteric religious beliefs and practices, in
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which the latter are restricted to the intellectual elite. Often a specific religious practice is interpreted to
possess a higher meaning for the philosopher, set in the Neoplatonic context of the purification of the
soul from its bodily attachments. Exoteric religious doctrines, as for al-Fārābī, are seen as symbolic
images of the philosophical truth. Moreover, the Ikhwān also introduce the concepts of a philosophical
religion (dīn al-falsafa) and philosophical worship (al-ʻibāda al-falsafiyya al-ilāhiyya) which go beyond the
requirements of the exoteric religion. These include philosophical rites and festivals supposedly
practiced by the Greek philosophers, which the Ikhwān perceive to be analogous with their Islamic
counterparts.
The purpose of this paper is first of all to present the Ikhwān’s theory for the causes behind the existence
of a plurality of religions, and secondly to see how it relates to their ideal of philosophical religion. When
discussing their own religious practices and beliefs, they employ specificly Islamic terms. Still, the Ikhwān
often speak approvingly of the practices of a variety of religions as fulfilling a similar spiritual purpose.
Can all religions, then, be seen to be equal in the sense that all of them eventually lead to the same
philosophical truth? Much of the religious pluralism in the Ikhwān can be understood from within the
Ismaili doctrine of successive exoteric revelations. But the Ikhwān’s idea of religious pluralism appears to
go beyond this, especially in its reveration of ancient Greek religious practices.

Pierre Mauboussin, Independent,
pierrem15@yahoo.com
“The Scope of Aristotelian Demonstration in Late Antiquity”
Proclus offers several criticisms of Aristotle's theory of mathematics, in particular, the notion of
intellectual matter as it relates to Aristotle's theory of mathematical cognition. In several passages,
Proclus also severely criticizes the limitations (as he sees them) of Aristotelian demonstration in
comparison to the knowledge to be gained of the pure intelligibles apart from discursive reason,
especially by means of theurgical rites. In comparison, Proclus' student Ammonius and his successors in
Alexandria repeatedly stress the importance of logic and demonstration to philosophy as the “method”
of philosophy. Ammonius goes so far as to reject Alexander of Aphrodisias by making logic itself part of
(and not just a tool) of philosophy. These contrasts regarding the status of Aristotelian logic with both
the Peripatetic and earlier Neoplatonic traditions suggests an important disagreement between the
Alexandrians and the earlier commentators regarding the scope of knowledge obtainable by Aristotelian
demonstration. In this paper, I trace the basis for these disagreements to differences in what objects are
considered available to the unaided human intellect, with the later Alexandrians maintaining that
Aristotelian science (in some sense) has access to the divine entities (such as the planets) that earlier
Neoplatonism considered more properly to be above the level of the human intellect without divine
assistance. In conclusion I suggest that these differences had an important role in medieval Christian
and Islamic thought through the development of the notion of natural or rational theology.
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Abdurakhmonova Mavzuna, Khorog State University, Tajikistan,
mavzuna-87@mail.ru
“The Global Perspective of Ancient Achaemenid and Roman Empires vs. the Greek Concept of a Limited
City State”
As stated by J. Toynbee, the Ancient Iranian –Tajik Achaemenid Empire (550-330BC) is the first transnational global vision of a political government. This paper depicts the underlying political philosophy of
the Achaemenid dynasty and compares it with the political systems of ancient Assyria, Egypt, Attic
Greek, and Rome. Special foci include allowance for freedom of choice in languages, religions and
customs, as well as the imposition of unity in military security as well as economic systems of the
empire. The presentation ends by reflections on the applicability of philosophical principles of ancient
models of government to the present age of global village.
Marina McCoy, Boston College,
mccoyma@bc.edu
“Images as Argumentation in Plato's Gorgias”
Much Platonic scholarship presents Plato as either ignoring or disparaging the imagination as a
legitimate part of argument. This paper argues that Socrates uses images as part of argumentation in the
Gorgias and that such use ought to lead us to reconsider the standard view(s) of the Platonic
imagination. Socrates seeks to use images to affect the appetitive and thumotic parts of Callicles’ soul in
order to persuade him to reconsider his intellectual concepts: images such as leaky jars, birds, and the
kinaidos. There, Socrates uses imagery in order to bring to life tensions and even contradictions in the
interior life of his interlocutor. Those tensions are not reducible to something like contradictions in
Callicles’ propositional beliefs, but rather are more like contradictions and tensions in Callicles’ beliefs,
desires, and vision of the good, that is, ideas that Callicles holds and lives, not only at an intellectual but
also an affective level. I suggest that Socrates might understand such images to be useful because
imagination is a faculty that draws together sensitive experience and abstract, universal thinking. Images
presented verbally affect us both as a result of our past felt sensations and evaluative experiences, and
also constitute categorical thinking, insofar as language always draws upon that which is universal. Thus,
Plato shows that imagery can serve as a kind of bridge to other forms of rational argumentation.

Keith McPartland
“Inherence and Kath' Hauto Predication”
In Posterior Analytics I.4-5, Aristotle talks about the type of predication that must be present in the
premises and conclusions of scientific demonstrations. He claims that the predicate must be predicated
of the subject universally, where what is predicated of a subject universally is predicated of it ‘in every
case’, ‘in itself’, and ‘as such’. Aristotle goes on to distinguish at least two different cases of ‘in itself’ or
kath’ hauto predication. In this paper, I first try to get a bit clearer on the nature of universal and kath’
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hauto predication. I then argue that we can understand what is involved in kath’ hauto predication in
terms of the said-of and inherence relations that Aristotle discusses in the Categories. The ontological
ground for one sort of kath’ hauto predication is the fact that the ontological predicate is said-of the
ontological subject. The ontological ground for another sort of kath’ hauto predication is the inherence
of the ontological predicate in the ontological subject.

Christopher Merwin, New School for Social Research,
merwc322@newschool.edu
“Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Democracy of Happiness”
My paper seeks to examine Aristotle’s conception of happiness as described in the Nicomachean Ethics
as well as an examination of Thomas Aquinas’s reflections and reformulations of Aristotle and how this
might help modern moral actors bridge the distance to Aristotle’s virtue ethics. On its face Aristotle’s
virtue ethics do not appear to satisfy the needs of modern moral actors because of the inherently
undemocratic nature of his conception. However, we can appeal to Aquinas’s reinterpretation of some
of the specific Aristotelian virtues (namely magnanimity and magnificence) which would seem to be at
odds with modern democratic notions of happiness. In order to accomplish this I look at Aristotle's
specific comments on magnanimity and magnificence and their general role in the overall discussion of
eudaimonia and why these descriptions seem unsatisfying to modern moral actors. I then examine
Aquinas's reinterpretation of the same sections of Aristotle and show how Aquinas's is able to preserve
the spirit of Aristotle's virtue ethics while reinterpreting magnanimity and magnificence in a way which is
more easily taken up by modern democratic moral agents.

Ryan Middleton, University of Western Ontario,
rmiddle6@uwo.ca
“Law As the Expression of Statesmanship: the rule of law in Plato's Statesman”
Plato’s dialogue, the Statesman, is too often ignored in efforts to understand Plato’s political theory.
Worse, modern audiences (and scholars) who do read the dialogue imagine that Plato’s statesman is a
kind of tyrannical ruler whose decrees are to be followed exactly and under which laws the statesman
himself is not subject. In other words, readers believe Plato’s statesman is a despot. I shall argue that
this reading of the Statesman needs correcting.
While it is true that the statesman is not subject to his (or any) laws, the reason for this is due to a
limitation in law itself. To the statesman, the laws are merely a rough guide--similar to the general
prescriptions of a physician to a large group. These, however, could hardly be preferred to a prescription
tailored for the individual patient.
Likewise, the generality of laws prevents them from being perfectly beneficial in each particular case.
Hence, the rule of law is only second-best to a situation where the expertise of statesmanship could
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adjudicate particular cases. Yet the discussion in the Statesman suggests that democracy strips a society
of its ability to discover and authorize genuine statesmen. The rule by statesmen (though preferred) is
an option no longer available.
The only remaining alternative is the strict (i.e. ‘to the letter’) rule of the established laws--the
admittedly outdated laws of the past. This, I shall argue, is the correct interpretation of the political
theory in Plato’s Statesman. To defend it, I will propose that the connection between these two options
is found in the way that law imitates and represents statesmanship in lieu of an existing statesman.
In the Statesman, political integrity requires that sovereignty be constituted by the expertise of
statesmanship. There is only one real and legitimate form of government: the one where the ruler or
rulers truly possess statesmanship. Law can act as the expression of that knowledge. And in the absence
of an existing statesman, the laws laid down by previous statesmen act as an acceptable substitute ruler.
The rule of law, when that law is the product of statesmanship, is the best imitation of the rule by
statesmen.

Mark Moes, Grand Valley State University,
moesm@gvsu.edu
“Socrates on the "Greatest Things" in the Apology”
Plato’s Socrates says in the Apology that he spent his life examining and questioning people on how best
to live, but avows that he himself knows nothing important about the “greatest things” (ta megista). In
the Republic, Theaetetus, and Phaedo, however, Socrates presents radical and grandiose theories about
the “greatest things.” Sandra Peterson in her recent Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato
(Cambridge, 2011) offers an illuminating and original hypothesis which explains this puzzle of Socrates’
two contrasting ways of treating philosophy and the “greatest things,” without appealing to dubious
views about the development of Plato’s authorial intentions. She bases her hypothesis upon a reading of
the Apology that takes Socrates’ avowals of ignorance about the “greatest things” as altogether sincere
and straightforward. She argues that, in stretches of the latter three dialogues where Socrates appears to
be confidently articulating his own doctrines, Plato really is depicting him as conducting the first steps of
an examination in which he is eliciting or extracting what his interlocutors believe is the best way to live,
constantly examining and always stopping short of endorsing any of the doctrines or suggestions he puts
forward. Plato depicts him as holding a mirror up the interlocutors, in order to bring their many
questionable convictions into the open for examination, and by doing so Plato gives readers reflections
of themselves to examine. She concludes that there is a single Socrates whose conception and practice
of philosophy, as centrally involving examining and as largely excluding the formulation of positive
doctrines or the endorsement of particular conceptions, remains the same throughout the dialogues.
Peterson uses her interpretation of Socrates’ speech in the Apology as the main basis for her
interpretations of all the dialogues. This approach bears a great deal of fruit in her stimulating reading of
various other dialogues. Nevertheless her conclusion is highly contestable. For Plato depicts Socrates in
the Phaedrus as embodying and expressing a dialectical method, a method which is not exhausted in
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examination and refutation, but includes a (revisable) theory-building component as well, and which
leaves place for the formulation of defensible positive theses (or at least the presentation of hints
toward the formulation of such theses). In this paper, I present the beginnings of an argument for
rejecting her conclusion, by putting some aspects of her reading of the Apology into question.

Patrick Mooney, John Carroll University,
pmooney@jcu.edu
“Socrates' Philosophy of Language: What Ion Doesn't Know”
In Plato’s Ion, Socrates argues that Ion the rhapsode is unable to speak “cleverly” about Homer’s poetry
on account of any knowledge he has of it, because he lacks any. This is an astonishing claim to make in
light of Ion’s recent competitive success at the Festival of Asclepius for his rhapsody (reciting epic poetry
for audiences, Homer being Ion’s specialty); in addition, Ion is known for his great ability to speak about
Homer’s work, presumably by offering explanations and interpretations of Homer’s work. How, then,
can he not possess knowledge of Homer’s work? How can he not speak cleverly about it? And why is
Socrates—someone otherwise exclusively focused upon questions about human virtue—interested in
these topics?
This paper defends the view that, contrary to what is often concluded about this short dialogue, Socrates
is in fact arguing that Ion cannot speak cleverly about Homer’s poetry—precisely because he lacks
knowledge of it (and so Socrates is not here instead paving the way for attributing Ion’s ability to “divine
inspiration”). What emerges from this view is nothing less than Socrates’ philosophy of language—a
philosophy that is all-but obscured by the more common reading of the dialogue—according to which it
is our natural interest in the truth about things that secures reference, and not a sentence’s “meaning”
(a meaning that is officially neutral concerning matters of truth or falsehood).
In addition to defending Socrates’ unusual philosophy of language, the paper explains what connection
there is for him between questions about reference (as we moderns sometimes call them) and questions
about virtue, his normal setting. This connection, it is maintained, rests with how he thinks about our
natural interest in the truth about things, particularly when it comes to matters of the good.

Parviz Morewedge, GSP, SUNY OWB,
pmorewed@gmail.com
“Avicenna and Tusi on Analytics in the Light of Contemporary Philosophies of Logic and Mathematics”
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This paper examines Avicenna’s notion of number and categories and Tusi’s doctrines of syntactical and
phenomenological models of infinity in the context of contemporary philosophies of mathematics and
logic.
J.J. Mulhern, University of Pennsylvania,
johnjm@sas.upenn.edu
“Politeia in Aristotle, Pol. IV: An Annotated Catalogue”
Aristotle’s Politics contains over 500 occurrences of the expression politeia, and Book IV contains about
130 of them. Modern English-language translators have rendered by ‘constitution’ in almost every case;
but few have said what they think that a constitution is, so it is not clear what they have intended their
translations to mean. And in English, as the OED shows, ‘constitution’ is an expression with a variety of
senses, which may not match up exactly with the senses of politeia in Aristotle or other Greek authors.
Following indications in Bonitz, Newman, Rhodes, Bordes, and others, I have undertaken an annotated
catalogue of all the occurrences of this expression in the Politics, having already completed a trial run
with the Politeia of the Athenians, which contains 62 occurrences and which was one of the preliminary
studies on which the Politics was based. This scholarly tradition recognizes several senses of politeia,
and I propose here to show how these are distributed in Book IV.
This trial-run material was presented in two conference papers: “Politeia in the Aristotelian Politeia of
the Athenians: A Catalogue of Uses,” Annual Meeting, Northeastern Political Science Association,
Philadelphia, November 18, 2011; and “Politeia as Citizenship in Aristotle,” Annual Meeting, American
Philological Association, Philadelphia, Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Panel, January 7, 2012.

Takeshi Nakamura, Osaka University of Health and Sport Sciences,
nakamura@ouhs.ac.jp
“The Theory of Receptacle and the Theory of Geometrical Particles in Plato’s Timaeus”
In the opening scene of the second part of the Timaeus (48e-52d) Plato introduces a genus called
“Receptacle.” This Receptacle seems to take up important roles in the Timaeus, but interpreters have
widely disagreed on what kind of roles exactly it plays since the way it is talked about is quite vague.
After introducing the theory of Receptacle, however, Plato starts presenting the theory that physical
objects in this natural world all consist of geometrical particles (53c ff.). A variety of interpretations have
also been offered regarding what these particles are.
At first sight, these two theories, the theory of Receptacle and that of geometrical particles, appear to be
completely different or even opposing explanations of the changes of natural objects. Receptacle is, after
all, a domain where many different qualities appear, and the qualitative changes of the same objects can
be explained by saying different qualities enter this domain one after another. On the other hand, the
theory of geometrical particles seems to explain the movements and qualitative changes of objects in
terms of the gathering and scattering of particles. However, if these prima facie interpretations are on
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the right track, why does Plato offer these two different explanations about the same event, i.e., the
changes of natural objects, side by side?
Taking this question into consideration, I will discuss the relation between the two theories: whether
they are compatible with each other and, as some have argued, they are complementing each other, or
they are incompatible in some way or other, as some have suggested.
In this presentation, I will show that the two theories are in fact incompatible with each other from the
following line of argument. First, as to the greatly controversial passage (48e-52d) in the theory of
Receptacle, I will argue that Cherniss’s and Lee’s reading of the passage is much more plausible than the
traditional reading. Then, I also suggest that even this (Cherniss’s) reading implies an interpretation of
the Receptacle which conflicts with the theory of geometrical particles. That is, according to Cherniss’s
(or Lee’s) version of the Receptacle theory, our ordinary conception of “thinghood”, which consists of an
underlying substratum and changing qualities, is dissolved into (part of) the Receptacle and separate
characters which enter and leave the Receptacle from time to time. Through this deconstruction of
“things” we can avoid the Parmenidean logical puzzle, which accuses us of calling the same thing “fire”
one moment and “water” the next. In one passage (81B-E) of the geometrical particle theory, however,
elemental triangles are said to go through aging deterioration, and this seems to imply that those
elemental triangles are, after all, functioning like “things”, which persist through changes of qualities or
characters.

Lawrence Nannery, St. Francis College,
lejn42@aol.com
“Epicureanism, Ancient and Modern”
A precis of the ethical teachings of Epicurus is given in the beginning. Then a consideration of David
Hume's ethical thought is given. Last, an outline of the presuppositions contained in Utilitarian thoght is
provided.
A comparison amng the three is the payoff, showing the superiorities of Epicurus to his modern
counterparts.

Zarifbekova Nigina, Association of Persian Studies, Tajikistan
shamstitanur@mail.ru
“AnaLysis of Philosophical Terms in Firdousi’s Book of King (Shahname) ”
This presentation focuses on a selected set of terms used in the 60,000 versus of epical poetry of
Shahname regarding the existential encounter such of human vision of free will vs. the determined
universal world order, the ephemeral strength of youth vs. the reality of frailty of old age, as well as joys
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and despairs of human existence. The paper concludes that Firdousi’s aim is to depict human behavior in
different existential sitautions; Firdousi does not prefer any specific universal ethics or theodicy.
Justin Nordin, Loyola University Chicago,
jpn144@gmail.com
“Playing With Mirrors: The Self-Reflexivity of Plato’s Metaphysics and Dialogues”
This paper seeks to answer the following question: What is the relation between Plato’s Metaphysics as
developed in the dialogues and his use of the dialogical form as a tool for conveying his Metaphysics?
While it has become relatively common for scholars to take into account the dramatic form of Plato's
dialogues while interpreting them, the explicit connection between Plato’s Metaphysics and his use of
dialogues is rarely developed. In short, it seems that there is a tendency to either read the dialogues
doctrinally, thus ignoring their dialogical form and the philosophical significance of this form, or to favor
a dramatic reading at the expense of any doctrinal reading, thereby ignoring the actual metaphysical
position that is developed within the dialogues.
In this essay, I will ground Plato’s use of dialogues in his Metaphysics, particularly with regards to the
relation between sensible and intelligible reality and the concept of recollection. Plato’s ontology will be
shown to be inherently self-reflexive, and this self-reflexivity will be shown to relate directly to Plato’s
use of the dialogical form. In order to bring the self-reflexive nature of Plato’s Metaphysics and
dialogues to light, I will focus on Plato’s use of the mirroring metaphor throughout the dialogues. I will
argue that the concept of “mirroring” pervades Plato’s Metaphysics at every level and unifies the
conceptual content of the dialogues with their dialogical form.

Lauren Olin, Washington University in St. Louis,
leolin@wustl.edu
“Plato on the Pleasures of Comedy”
Plato’s writings testify to his comedic sensitivity. His main character Socrates is endowed with a cunning
sense of humor and, often, this capacity is instrumental in his efforts to put “pretenders to wisdom” in
their places (Apology 33c). However, evidence of Plato’s skill as a humorist, and of Socrates’ ironic
disposition, is not easily brought to bear in interpretations of Plato’s position on the nature and value of
humor. In contrast to the view his talents inspire, Plato's explicit remarks on the subjects of humor and
comedy are largely negative (e.g. Laws 934d-936c; Apology 18d, 19c; Philebus 48a-50c; cf. Morreal 1983:
4-5).
In considering Plato’s position on humor, then, we are faced with an apparent paradox. There is
evidence that Plato thought deeply about humor and recognized its value, but at the same time there is
evidence that he disapproved of comedy and its consequences. As Wood (2007: 77) puts the point:
“Plato seems to practice comedy himself while condemning its use by others. He uses precisely those
features of comedy that his character Socrates criticizes in actual comedies: most notably imitation and
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ridicule.” The paradox is sharpened by the fact that standard interpretations of Plato’s discussion of
comedy in Philebus 48a-50c make it difficult to distinguish between the sorts of pleasures we experience
watching Socrates ridicule and humiliate his interlocutors, and those a malicious person experiences
witnessing the ridicule of a friend (Morreal 1983; McCabe 2010). It is made less obviously tractable by
the fact that his dialogues do not include a complete account of humor or comedy.
This paper aims first to reconstruct his views on these topics, and secondly to examine this apparent
paradox in light of that reconstruction. In the first part of the paper I provide an exposition of Plato's
discussion of comedy in the Philebus, and argue that it is intended to apply narrowly to the case of
malicious comedy: Plato’s general account of comic pleasure is more nuanced than commonly supposed.
In the second half I turn to the broader context of the Philebus, and reconstruct an account of humorous
amusement that is consistent with Plato’s general account of pleasure, and which implies that different
types of people experience the laughable in different ways – ways dictated by the desires of their souls.
In conclusion, I apply this account to the apparent paradox outlined above, and show that Plato’s
account, on my interpretation, has the resources to explain both why humor is a valuable part of the
good life, and why, for some individuals, exposure to humor brings only deleterious effects and should
not be indulged.
References:
McCabe, M.M. (2010). Banana Skins and Custard Pies: Plato on Comedy and Self-Knowledge. In L.
Brisson and J. Dillon (Eds.) Proceedings of the International Symposium Platonicum. Germany: Academia
Verlag, 194-208.
Morreal, J. (1983). Taking Laughter Seriously. New York: SUNY Press.
Wood, J.L. (2007). “Comedy, Malice, and Philosophy in Plato's Philebus.” Ancient Philosophy 27, 77-94.

Katharine O'Reilly, King's College London,
katharine.oreilly@kcl.ac.uk
“Epicurus and the Cyrenaics on Recollected and Anticipated Pain”
In his dying words, Epicurus describes the way in which the recollection of past pleasurable
conversations served to offset the extreme pain caused by the kidney stones that would soon kill him.
The memories brought him happiness, but in the mouth of a hedonist this produces a puzzle: since the
Epicurean of account of eudaimonia includes being free of pain, Epicurus seems to be contradicting
himself if he says that he is happy while at the same time experiencing the greatest pain of his life.
In the rival camp, the Cyrenaics emphasise the pleasure of the moment - desiring particular pleasures for
their own sake, and insisting that those are the telos of life. Yet we find in the ancient sources examples
of the Cyrenaics discussing issues that would only be of interest to someone who concerned with their
future happiness: pleasure over a lifetime, the utility of friendship, and the purpose of wealth, for
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example. Most problematically, for those who consider the Cyrenaics extreme presentists, they have
some strange advice about future pain, as reported by Cicero, in which they insist on the importance of
anticipating possible future evils, the pre-rehearsal of which mitigates their pain.
In this paper, I explore the evidence for the importance of recollected and anticipated pain in the
philosophy of these two schools. I argue that, for the Epicureans, training yourself to recall past painfree moments vividly is their most important tool for pain management, and one which has much to
reveal about the content of Epicurean therapy. The Cyrenaics, on the other hand, are not concerned
with the past. Their striking advice about the future is explained by a kind of moral economics game: in
anticipating merely possible future pain, they can lessen the shock of events which may come to pass,
thereby reducing the pain, without experiencing any increased pain in the present.
Just as the views of these rival hedonists on pleasure are crucial to our understanding of their
philosophy, so are their conceptions of the proper attitude towards pain. An exploration of their
accounts, and the dialectical environment in which they arose, reveals a new dimension of these
schools’ prescribed routes to happiness.

Orusbekova Parvina , Tajik Association of Media Professionals, Tajikistan,
orusbekova@yahoo.com
“Platonic Sources of Philosophy of Persons in Medieval Tajik-Iranian Mystical Poetry”
This paper begins by constructing a model of process of self-realization ethics based on Plato’s The
Republic (the allegory of the cave, the divided line) and The Symposium (the ladder of Eros). Next it
shows affinity between the original Greek model and the medieval Farsi mystical notions of Tariqa (the
way, Dao), Maqamat wa Ahwal ( the extensional and intentional (hermeneutic) phase of personal
transformation. Finally, our anaLysis examines the notion of truth (Asha [Ancient Persian] with attention
to P. Friedlander’s criticism of Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s notion of truth (aletheia). Finally the
investigation discusses how development of Platonic themes in medieval Persian mystical poetry is
similar to the Neoplatonic readings of Plato.
Eric Perl, Loyola Marymount University,
eperl@lmu.edu
“The Analogy of Transcendence:”
Prop. 130 of the Elements of Theology begins, “In any divine order the first terms transcend those
immediately subordinate to them in a greater way than the latter do their subsequents.” This means
that the principle of analogy governs not only the contents of each level of reality in relation to others,
but also the mode in which each level is higher than, or transcends, its subordinates. Thus, for example,
it is misleading to say simply that intellect transcends soul and that soul transcends body. Such a
formulation would suggest that transcendence itself is univocal in these two cases. Rather, we must say
that intellect transcends soul in a greater way than soul transcends body: transcendence itself is
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analogical. The same is true with regard to subdivisions within these levels, e.g. celestial as distinct from
sublunar bodies or the intelligible as distinct from the intellectual. The full significance of this principle,
however, emerges when it is applied to the highest level of all: the transcendence of the One to all
things whatsoever, transcends the transcendence of the intelligible to the sensible, or any other lesser
transcendence. The One’s transcendence is thus irreducible to either the “ontic” difference of one being
from another or the “metaphysical” difference of one level of reality from another. This is now well
recognized, and has been expressed by such formulations as “the other otherness” or “the second
transcendence.” But what prop. 130 reveals is that, since the modes of transcendence are analogically
related, the transcendence of the One may be regarded as the limit case of this general principle, the
stretching to infinity of these ascending modes. Since there is no proportion of finite to infinite, the
One’s transcendence is indeed incommensurable with all lesser modes of transcendence, but it is
nonetheless continuous with them. Taking the One as a “limit” that may be indefinitely approached but
never reached, in accordance with the principle articulated in prop. 130, allows us to avoid the anarchic
nihilism that threatens to result from the One’s infinite absence, without hypostasizing the One as an
attainable ultimate term in the ascending series.

Luca Pitteloud, Université de Fribourg, Switzerland,
luca.pitteloud@berkeley.edu
“Plato and thought experiments”
In this paper, I want to show how Plato uses thought experiments in order to prove the necessity of
postulating the hypothesis of Forms. It seems plausible to assert that, for Plato, his metaphysical theory
is linked with the possibility of describing the world without Forms. As his metaphysical proposal is
indeed what he calls a hypothesis, thought experiments can be viewed as a process to provide a counterhypothesis that would describe a possible world where the intelligible would have been eliminated. It
seems that the possibility to imagine a counter-factual situation is for Plato an efficient way of providing
an argument in favor of the existence of Forms. I shall propose a possible definition of what are thought
experiments in Plato’s Metaphysics: in order to provide a proper account of thought experiments, I will
show that they have to be distinguished from other devices Plato sets up to illustrate what is the state of
the world with the Forms, as for instance the Cave (Republic, 514a-521e). Contrary to an allegory,
thought experiments consists of a counter-factual imaginative exercise which will be illustrated by the
two following passages: 1) Socrates dream in the Theaetetus (201c-202c) in comparison with the Late
Learners in the Sophist (251b) and the question of the absence of Forms; 2) the hypothesis “if the One is
not” in the last two series of deductions in the Parmenides (164b6-166b2) as a way of describing the
world of appearance if intelligible realities are supposed not to exist. I shall conclude my paper with
some elements concerning the consistency of such thought experiments within a rational argument.

Julie Ponesse, SUNY Brockport,
jponesse@brockport.edu
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“Aristotle on Akrasia and Moral Perception”
The focus of this paper is Aristotle's solution to the problem of akrasia (incontinence or “weakness of
will”) in Nicomachean Ethics VII.3. There, the explanation for why the akratic person fails to do what he
believes to be right is that he acts in ignorance of the wrongness of his action. The akratic experiences
what Christopher Shields calls a kind of "implementation failure," abandoning reason because of the
attraction of available pleasures. But the puzzle remains, why does the akratic fail to “exercise” or
“attend to” the conclusion of his practical syllogism (1146b33-1147a18)?
To answer this question, commentators have tended to focus on the akratic’s failure to properly
adjudicate the struggle between his rational impulse and the countervailing influence of some nonrational emotion (pathos) that ultimately overwhelms his choice (1147a14-17). But this leaves
unexplained what are the psychological mechanisms that account for this failure. To say that the akratic’s
desire for pleasure trumps his desire to follow reason is not to explain why this occurs.
A key piece of the puzzle is to be found outside Aristotle’s moral philosophy, in his psychology and
natural philosophy. I draw on Tony Roark’s recent work in Aristotle on Time, which argues for the
importance of temporal perception in the development of cognition, to explain why the akratic is unable
to resist detrimental temptations. Roark’s key insight is that reason (concerned with what may be in the
future) and desire (concerned only with what is immediately at hand) generate for the akratic a conflict
between what is good in the future versus what is good now. I appeal to Roark’s account of the role of
imagination (phantasia) in the formation of counterfactuals to explain why the akratic inadequately
perceives the relevant features of his situation. Imagination, I will argue, allows the virtuous person to
adopt the appropriate perspective on what is hypothetically possible. The akratic, by contrast, either
cannot fully imagine future objects of desire or he misjudges their allure relative to present goods.
Because the akratic sees a future pleasure as a non-live possibility and hence as no possibility at all, he
cannot imagine himself choosing other than what is presented immediately to him.
This picture explains both forms of akrasia mentioned in NE VII.3: impetuosity and weakness (1150b1926). The impetuous person’s inability to form counterfactual phantasms prevents him from reaching the
conclusion suggested by the major and minor premise (misjudgment); the weak person misjudges the
relative goodness of counterfactual phantasms, which prevents him from allowing the dictates of the
syllogism’s conclusion to carry him all the way to action (inaction based on true judgment). In both cases,
the akratic’s underdeveloped moral perception makes him unable to apprehend the relevant facts of a
conflicting situation in a motivationally effective way. Focusing on the akratic’s failure in moral
perception, and hence on his underdeveloped intellectual virtue, best explains why Aristotle would say
that the akratic acts in ignorance, specifically in ignorance of the value of any future sense of his own
agency.

Tiberiu Popa, Butler University,
tpopa@butler.edu
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“Scientific Method in Meteorology IV”
This paper is a contribution to the debate about the extent to which Aristotle’s theory of scientific
inquiry outlined in the Posterior Analytics and elsewhere was applied in his works on zoology and
‘chemistry’. One of my main claims is that a careful reading of Meteorology IV can lend support to a
number of recent studies devoted to Aristotle’s biological treatises, studies that emphasize significant
connections with Aristotle’s more general and programmatic texts dealing with scientific understanding.
Material powers or dispositions (liquefiable, fragile etc.) play a dominant role in Meteorology IV (a) in
virtue of their role in the generic division of uniform stuffs, based on successive differentiation and
multiple differentiae, and (b) in virtue of their explanatory power, as they seem to reveal otherwise
undetectable characteristics of uniform materials (chemical composition and physical microstructure).
While Aristotle occasionally starts with accounts of ingredients and their ratio (e.g., ‘stuffs that contain
mostly water behave in this or that way’), the natural direction of Aristotle’s investigation is from
observations regarding dispositional properties and their manifestation to accounts of chemical
composition and microstructure. Inferences that reflect this direction tend to be easily syllogizable; this
feature (along with the criteria governing the method of division) argues, I believe, for the compatibility
of Meteorology IV with texts such as the Posterior Analytics.

Tony Preus, Binghamton University,
apreus@binghamton.edu
“Socrates in Aristotle: Some Oddities”
Aristotle’s comments on the Socrates may be grouped into those that focus on metaphysical issues,
particularly distinguishing Socrates’ views from those of Plato; opinions about ethical and political
matters; and some miscellaneous comments that fit in neither of those categories. Some of these
comments have had significant influence on the philosophical interpretation of Plato’s dialogues,
especially, and on the reconstruction of the thought of the historical Socrates. It is not always easy to
determine whether Aristotle is talking about the historical Socrates or the character in Plato’s dialogues;
we also don’t know the extent to which Aristotle’s rather schematic understanding of the development
of philosophy before his time has influenced his mental image of Socrates. We can, however, compare
his comments with the texts of Plato and others and then point out discrepancies that need some sort of
explanation. Does Aristotle provide a corrective to the Platonic image of Socrates, or does Aristotle
reveal his own methodology in his treatment of the figure of Socrates? We here focus on the nature of
the interpretive problem.

Habibeh Rahim, St. John’s University,
rahim.h2007@yahoo.com
“Considerations on Said Nursi and Allama Tabatabai as Regards Universalism and the Ethics of
Humanity”

Abstracts, SAGP/SSIPS 2012, Page 56 of 75

September 17, 2012

Originating from different socio-cultural backgrounds with varied creedal affiliations (Sunni and Shi’a),
Said Nursi (d. 1960) and Allama Tabatabai (d. 1981) share a remarkable cohesion of positions and views.
At the foremost, both were concerned with the morass of the Umma in general and sought ways to uplift
them. Though they were distinct in the details of their approach, they were similar in recognizing the
need for constructive progressive thought. Secondly, they sought to find common ground with other
faith traditions in order to maintain and consolidate the essential telos of Islam. In this aspect as well,
their methods differed but the end goal was similar. Finally, most significantly, they sought to refer to the
revealed scripture of Islam, the sacred Qur’an, in order to find solutions and resolutions to the pragmatic
and ideological needs of the societies in which they lived. To this end they penned voluminous
commentaries related to the message of the Qur’an by way of the Risale-i Nur and Tafsir al-Mizan
respectively. In my paper, I examine the remarkable convergences between these two thinkers and
identify the details of their differences in their discussion of four seminal ayats of the Qur’an.
Jean-Philippe Ranger, St. Thomas University,
jpranger@stu.ca
“Was Callicles Refuted?”
In this paper, I analyze Socrates’ refutation of Callicles (Gorg. 481b-506c) to determine whether it is
successful. I argue that on one level, Socrates does refute Callicles insofar as he shows that there is an
inconsistency in his opponent’s initial set of beliefs: his praise of wisdom and courage is incompatible
with hedonism. However, that refutation is for Callicles purely superficial and does not get to the bottom
of things (499b). Furthermore, the lesson he takes away from the exchange is that it is imperative to
reject hedonism. Insofar as Callicles does that, his debate with Socrates strengthens his overall position.
In the end, Socrates does not succeed in refuting Callicles’ ethical theory.
I develop this argument in three steps. First I analyze Callicles’ position in his first speech by comparing it
to two similar positions: the Athenians in Thucydides’ Melian dialogue and Thrasymachus’ in Rep. I. After
having established that Callicles’ position is different from the two others, I examine how the part of the
debate that happens directly after the first speech provides useful insight into Calliclean ethics. In the
second part of my paper, I examine certain formal elements of the Socratic elenchus that can help us
understand Socrates’ strategy in the exchange. Namely, it explains the (apparently sudden) examination
of the value of temperance. In the third and final section of my paper, I analyze Socrates’ response to
Callicles’ beliefs concerning pleasure. By showing Callicles how the claim that “pleasure is the good” is
incompatible with his initial speech, he exposes an inconsistency in Callicles’ belief-set. However,
contrary to what seemingly happens in other dialogues where the elenchus is prominent, the result is
not that Callicles rejects the belief he espouses in his first speech. Rather, he rejects the claim of
hedonism. By the end of the debate (and at the end of the dialogue) Plato presents us two rival moral
theories that are incompatible. The troubling point is that he does not offer us the tools to choose
between them.
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Heather L. Reid, Morningside College,
reid@morningside.edu
“Beautiful Virtue: Aristotle on Kalokagathia”
In Rhetoric Aristotle praises the beauty of the pentathlete. It is not the idle observation of a sports
fan. In fact, the balanced and harmonious beauty of these athletes’ bodies reflects Aristotle’s ideal of a
virtuous soul as described in the Nicomachean Ethics: one able to discern noble ends and means, and to
transform those ideas into physical activity completed by the pleasure appropriate to happiness
(eudaimonia). In stark contrast to the aristocratic idea of inborn virtue, Aristotelian aretē is a matter of
deliberate character training (ethos), complemented by the intellectual understanding of what is
beautiful (kalon). In Eudemian Ethics 8.15. Aristotle goes on to explain his idea of beautiful goodness
(kalokagathia). The purpose of this paper is to identify kalokagathia with the aretē described
in Nicomachean Ethics as the ability to perform beautiful and good actions for the sake of beauty and
goodness. As Aristotle says, “Kalokagathia is perfect
excellence” ἔστιν οὖν καλοκἀγαθία ἀρετὴ τέλειος (1249a15-17).
Matthew Robinson, Boston College,
matthew.robinson@bc.edu
“The Aristotelian noetic in Bonaventure and the early 13th Century Franciscans”
This paper aims to clarify the pre-Thomistic development of Latin interpretations of the agent intellect
within the Franciscan school. It briefly outlines Bonaventure's interpretation of the agent intellect as a
power of the individual soul, and then traces important elements of this account to the earlier
Franciscans John of la Rochelle and Alexander of Hales, and to two anonymous Latin authors. The aim of
the paper is to highlight to what degree Bonaventure's account is innovative, and in what ways it
depends upon his predecessors.

Thanassis Samaras, UGA,
samaras@gwu.edu
“Who Are Aristotle's Many?”
In this paper I argue for the following theses:
1)
Aristotle’s classification of constitutions in the Politics III 7, which follows Plato’s classification in
the Politicus with one inconsequential change, decisively frames the discussion of constitutional types
that follows. There has been a tendency among commentators to ignore or downplay this classification,
but there is no reason to do so.
2)
Despite being a form of ‘rule by the many’, polity is not a democracy either in the sense that a
contemporary of Aristotle would understand the term or according to Aristotle’s own determination of
what constitutes a democracy in III 1, 2 and 4.
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The critical points which differentiate Aristotle’s polity from democracy are:
a)

Not all native adult males are citizens.

b)
The many in polity turn out to be a group between the dēmos and the oligoi. They are a middle
hoplitic class and in some versions of polity Aristotle calls them hoi mesoi, a term which cannot in any
way be regarded as a synonym or even rough equivalent of the hoi polloi.
There are more differences to be added to this list, but it is also indicative of Aristotle’s intentions that he
calls this constitutional type politeia, a term which distinguishes it from democracy, whereas Plato was
happy to call democracy both the correct and the deviant type of rule by the many.
For this reason, the position that Aristotle can be regarded as sympathetic to democracy because of the
merits that he attributes to polity is untenable. On the more general question of his attitude towards
democracy there is also III 11, where he talks about the intellectual abilities of the plēthos. I have
explained why in my article in Classical Quarterly 57 (2007): 77–89.
3)
If thesis 2 is correct, it is not possible to interpet Aristotle as a pro-democratic thinker who can
be placed, historically, at the inception of what has come to be known as the republican tradition.
Aristotle’s concept of polity belongs to this tradition, but as part of a wider, and actually anti-democratic,
net of ideas which were around in the fourth century.

Jonathan Sanford, Franciscan University of Steubenville,
jsanford@franciscan.edu
“Aristotle and the Privation Theory of Evil”
The contention that evil is a deprivation of a due good and no per se being is at the heart of Augustine’s
post-Manichean view of reality, but it is usually remembered that the origins of Augustine’s theory are
not Christian but Neoplatonic. In Ennead I.8 Plotinus posits matter as evil and at II.4 as a privation. The
identification of a metaphysical account of evil with matter has its own problems, nevertheless one has
to start somewhere, and philosophical accounts of evil as a privation begin there, or so the standard
narrative goes.
Is this, however, the beginning of the story? I argue that it is not, and that, in fact, Aristotle employs a
privation theory of evil. To be sure, this is not a privation theory of evil of the Plotinian variety, and
indeed it is Plotinus himself who emphasizes the distance of his own account from Aristotle’s when in
Ennead II.4. 16, 3-8 he rejects the Aristotelian distinction between matter and privation. For Plotinus,
matter is privation.
A typical interpretation is that Aristotle’s treatment of evil is compatible with a privation theory of evil,
but nevertheless that Aristotle lacks a metaphysical account of evil as privation. It is the latter
assumption I wish to challenge.
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The most critical passage for attempting to justify my claim that Aristotle maintains a privation theory of
evil is Meta 9.9. In this chapter of Theta Aristotle compares the relative perfection of good potentialities
and actualities (tēs spoudaias dunameōs hē energeia) on the one hand, and of potentialities and bad
actualizations (tōs kakōs) on the other. He contends in this passage that although in general actuality is
prior to potentiality in formula and substance, a bad actuality is always posterior to potentiality and
further, that there can be no bad apart from bad things (dēlon ara hoti ouk esti to kakon para ta
pragmata). The reasons for these claims, I will contend, is that any bad actuality can only be understood
as such because it is the contrary of a good actuality, it is the good actuality which reveals the
potentiality, and bad actualities manifest themselves as bad precisely because of their failure to achieve
the actualization (entelecheia) of a given being’s actuality (energeia), understood as a failure to reach the
end (telos) of a substance’s essence (to ti ēn einai).
This account makes possible a treatment of evil which attributes to it a sort of reality as either a kind of
fulfillment (teleios), such as in Meta. V, or as a quality (to poion), such as in Meta. V. 14, while at the
same seeing such fulfillments or qualities as perversions (kai gar hē diaphthora tōn kakōn estin (Meta.
1151a 21)). There are significant metaphysical and ethical implications which can be drawn from
Aristotle’s distinctive privation of theory of evil, but the purpose of this paper is not to draw them out
but to make the case that Aristotle maintains such a theory.

Gina Santiago, Binghamton,
gsantia2@binghamton.edu
“Language and Reality in Euthydemus: The Denial of Becoming and Denial of Falsehood in the Second
Eristic Display”
In this paper, my overall aim is to offer and defend an interpretation which examines the critical,
philosophical function of two conclusions advanced by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, in the second,
eristic display of Plato’s Euthydemus: the implied rejection of becoming and the denial of the possibility
of falsehood. That is, the denial of becoming and the denial of falsehood are not solely facetious,
insincere, and absurd claims consciously employed by Plato to expose the antipode of the Socratic
dialectic, as Sprague suggests. What underpins these claim are philosophical issues that challenge the
philosophical assumptions and concerns harbored by Socrates.
The one underlying, philosophical issue that is the focus of this paper is the degree to which language
latches onto an ontological reality. The latter is inextricably tied to the former and in the Euthydemus
they engender an obstruction to Socrates’s’ moral project. As O’Leary-Hawthorne notes, these two
issues are also present in other dialogues, most notably The Sophist. What I am specifically concerned
with is how the denial of becoming and the denial of falsehood challenge the moral aims of the Socratic
elenchus.
In Section I, I briefly explicate the general differences between my approach to the dialogue and
traditional approaches. A survey of the literature on Euthydemus suggests that the text has been
primarily taken to be a protreptic, one in which Plato is juxtaposing two approaches to the philosophy
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that have diametrical opposed aims: the eristic displays, geared toward verbal argumentation and
victory, and the dialectic employed by Socrates, to exhort Cleinias to take up philosophy. According to
Chance, Plato renders the eristic approach to philosophy a “negative paradigm” that is sharply
contrasted with the more constructive elenchus of Socrates.
In Section II, I analyze the two passages in the second, eristic display, tracing out the emergence of the
issue of language and ontology. I consider analyses of this passage offered by Chance, Sprague, which are
helpful in highlighting the significance of this passage and how it impinges on Socrates concerns about
virtue, knowledge and happiness. I am interested in the constructive and philosophically substantive
ways in which the denial of becoming and the denial of falsehood motivate the philosophical issues
within the context of Euthydemus itself. We can understand the claims made by the eristic pair as
pointed examples of the tenuous relationship between language and ontology. They pose a challenge
precisely because they highlight the disparity between language and ontology.
Since the aims of Socratic dialectic in the Euthydemus are centered on an exhortation to virtue, I
consider whether the tenuous relationship between language and ontology is at all an issue for Socrates.
The eristic arguments stem from ontological claims that do not seem to overlap with the broader, moral
concerns. Nevertheless, I argue, Socrates ought to seriously consider these claims in order to resume his
ultimate goal- the exhortation to virtue and self-knowledge.

Anne Schultz, Baylor,
Anne_Marie_Schultz@baylor.edu
“The Narrative Frame of Plato’s Lysis: A Socratic Self-Portrait of Moral Psychology and Philosophical
Friendship”
In this paper, I analyze how the narrative aspects of the Lysis illustrate Socrates’ understanding of the
moral psychology both in terms of his self-understanding and in terms of how he views what would
morally benefit his interlocutors. As such, a consideration of moral psychology in this dialogue point to a
reconsideration of the nature of friendship itself. This paper divides into three parts. First, I briefly
describe the narrative structure and setting of the Lysis to establish what I mean by the narrative aspects
of the dialogue. Briefly, the narrative aspects include an awareness of who Socrates’ auditor is, or at least
the sort of person he might be, the very fact that Socrates is narrating an account of his own
philosophical conversation, and that his narrative description provides interpretative tools to help us
understand the philosophical elements of the dialogue. I then show that Socrates’ narrative
commentary draws attention to Hippothales, Ctesippus, Lysis and Menexenus and how they interact with
each other. By describing the emotions, psychological motivations and behaviors of his main
interlocutors, Socrates highlights the differences between their active and passive modes of social
engagement. These different modes of social engagement illustrate how their capacity for genuine
friendship and for philosophical inquiry is shaped by their respective moral psychologies. Second, I
demonstrate how Socrates’ narrative remarks highlight his own mental states, his emotional states, and
his responses to his emotions. These self-reflective remarks offer a preliminary indication of how
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Socrates’ practice of philosophy incorporates the emotional as well as the intellectual dimensions of
human experience. To explain briefly, when Socrates discloses his mental and emotional states to the
auditor, he paints a detailed portrait of the philosopher in action. These details reveal Socrates’
intellectual adaptability, his ongoing interrogative stance and his commitment to sustained philosophical
conversation. But more importantly, the narrative commentary shows how Socrates’ interest in eros
particularly and the emotions more generally shapes his philosophic practice. By revealing these aspects
of his philosophical process throughout his narrative commentary, Socrates provides the auditor with a
positive model of friendship, the very quality under discussion in the dialogue. This narrative portrait of
Socrates presents an initial challenge to the common view of Socrates as an intellectualist. Finally, I
address how the narrative relationship between Socrates and his auditor allows us to interpret the
aporetic conclusion of the dialogue in positive terms.

Bongrae Seok, Alvernia University,
Bongrae.Seok@alvernia.edu
“Correlative Homology and Confucian Moral Virtue”
Moral virtues are character traits or long term dispositions that guide a person's moral attitudes,
emotions, and actions. In early Confucian tradition, however, moral virtues are often associated with and
observed through non moral properties of the world, such as physical features of the body (facial
features, skin color or texture), physiology of internal organs, and other non-moral qualities (color,
sound, direct etc.) of the world. For example, righteousness (yi) is linked to and explained by the lungs
and the musical note of shang. In many pre-Han and Han texts, this correlative homology is a popular
style of explanation and argumentation in moral psychology and moral metaphysics. The paper discusses
philosophical implications of the embodied and correlative nature of Confucian moral virtues. If moral
virtues are compared with and explained by physical properties of the world, can Confucian virtues be
regarded as character traits based on personal dispositions? Or are they particular patterns
(personal/dispositional types) of causal relations that can be shared by many non-moral properties of
the world? By analyzing early Confucian texts, the author of the paper develops an interpretation of the
unity, cultivation, and identification of Confucian virtue in the context of correlative and embodied moral
psychology.

Ehsan Shamsi, George Town U, USA; Beheshti U, Iran,
ehsan_shamsi2000@yahoo.com
Reflections on the Relation between Jurisprudence and Biomedical ethics in Medieval Islamic Tradition
This study investigates the philosophical theological basis of Islamic Jurisprudence as a framework for
medieval bioethical theories in the medical works of Z. Razi and Avicenna, in comparison with Greek
(e.g. (e.g. Galen) and Jewish (e.g. Maimonides) traditions.
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James Shaw, University of Tennessee,
jshaw15@utk.edu
“Hedonism and Courage in Plato”
In the Gorgias (497e-499b), Socrates offers an argument that hedonism effaces the distinctions between
cowardice and courage and between wisdom and foolishness. In the Philebus(55b), he makes a very
brief argument to the same effect. In the Protagoras (358a-360e), on the other hand, Socrates attempts
a hedonist argument for the unity of courage and wisdom that maintains the distinction between that
virtue and its opposite (which has, or has species with, various names: cowardice, rashness, madness,
and ignorance).
Starting from a position that takes Plato to think that hedonism is the central commitment of popular
morality, this paper attempts to recover Plato's argument that popular-cum-hedonist views cannot
distinguish courage from cowardice. It then considers the relationship between the view so criticized
and the view attributed to the many in the Protagoras, that courageous people go toward what they find
fearful (359c-d; cf. 349e). Finally, it considers the consequences of this interpretation for questions
about the attribution of hedonism in the Protagoras.

Mark Shiffman, Villanova University,
mark.shiffman@villanova.edu
“The Hermeneutics of Self-knowledge in Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris”
Plutarch’s Isis and Osiris presents itself as an effort to uncover the genuine meaning of Egyptian myths,
doing so in terms of Platonic metaphysics. Understanding this goal simplistically leads scholars to see
the text as a piece of Greco-Roman cultural imperialism. Plutarch, however, is less concerned with
antiquarian accuracy in cultural studies than with promoting self-knowledge. He initially approaches his
topic in terms of naturalistic and cosmological interpretations of the myths, but the ground soon shifts to
an eroto-centric reading, then finally to a hermeneutical “recovery” of the original intentions of
philosophical statesman-poets to overcome the “Typhonic” bestiality latent in the human soul by
directing peoples toward a vision of the noble. Thus over the work as a whole, the emphasis shifts from
the first principle sought by the soul to the experiences of the soul itself as incomplete and seeking; and
Plutarch tries to put these experiences into the perspective of the shaping of the soul on the most
fundamental level, accomplished by the laws. The initial structuring opposition of pure/impure is
gradually replaced by that of human/bestial, with a corresponding shift in the relevant understanding of
the kalon and the purposes of myth in the service of philosophy.

Chryssi Sidiropoulou, Boğazici University, Istanbul,
“Augustine and Islamic falsafa. Neo-platonic convergences and divergences”
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This paper offers a comparison between St. Augustine’s Theory of Illumination on the one hand, and the theory of
conjunction with the Agent Intellect put forward by the representatives of Islamic falsafa, on the other. No
exhaustive presentation of these theories will be attempted in the present confines. Rather, our focus is on
highlighting what we see as a shared neoplatonic framework of assumptions behind both philosophical
perspectives. So it is argued that both Augustine and Islamic philosophers such as Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina approach
the question of human knowledge in a distinctively Platonic way, namely how do human beings raise themselves
to the knowledge of universals? The paper retraces Augustine’s theory of Illumination as it appears towards the
end of De Magistro, intertwined with the conception of the Christ as the Interior Teacher. It then discusses the
Islamic conception of the Agent Intellect (al -‘aql al-fa” āl). In so doing, it underscores the latter’s character of
philosophical analogue for the angel of revelation (Jebril) in the religious tradition of Islam. Ultimately, the paper
argues that both Augustine and the Islamic ‘peripatetics’ (mashsha’i) mentioned above, advance a very similar
neo-platonic epistemology; but that they diverge where their respective theologies (Christianity’s Incarnation,
Trinitarian understanding of God and the Logos doctrine as opposed to Islam’s strict monotheism, centrality of
prophecy, and revelation to Muhammad) entail considerably different conceptual formations of their respective
neo-platonic positions.

Chryssi Sidiropoulou, Boğazici University,
“Detached Souls versus Pious Persons: Agent Intellect and Human Destiny in Islamic Neoplatonism”
This paper examines Al-Farabi’s and Ibn Sina’s theory of the agent intellect focusing on their respective accounts of
human knowledge through grasp of universals. In this context it discusses aspects of their epistemology in an
attempt to highlight the neoplatonist character of their conception of the agent intellect and its repercussions for
human happiness and fulfillment. From the point of view of Islamic orthodoxy this seems to raise considerable
difficulties. It is argued that such difficulties lie behind Al-Ghazali’s notorious criticism of the falasifa in his
Incoherence of the Philosophers. Two of the issues raised by al-Ghazali are analyzed in this connection: a) The
resurrection of bodies and b) God’s knowledge of particulars. The paper suggests that both problems ultimately
derive from a prevailing intellectualism of an unmistakably neoplatonist type.
Peter Simpson, CUNY,
psimpson@gc.cuny.edu
“aristotle's ethics: all four of them”
Scholars generally agree that Aristotle's Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics are genuine and that the
Eudemian is earlier. They also generally agree that the Magna Moralia is probably not genuine and that
On Virtues and Vices is certainly not genuine. There is, however, no non-question begging evidence for
any of these claims, and the historical evidence is in favor of genuineness (only EE and NE having any
doubt cast on them). The philosophical and literary features of all four works are better explained by
difference of audience, not by difference of author or time of writing: NE is directed to legislators; EE to
philosophers; MM to decent citizens; VV is an abstract of endoxa for philosophical purposes and is
referred to as such by EE. This way of viewing the four works and their relations makes better sense of all
of them.
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Charles Snyder, New School for Social Research,
snydc357@newschool.edu
“Ethical Implications of Academic Epoche in Cicero's Academica”
This paper will argue that the Stoic apraxia charge against Academic epoche demonstrates the success of
the Academic refutation of the cataleptic impression. This paper will conclude then that Academic
skepticism is not required to defend the possibility of action or virtue on the basis of a theory of
knowledge.

Nathanael Stein, Florida State University,
nstein2@fsu.edu
“Aristotle and the Whittling Argument”
In his discussion of time in Physics iv 10-14, Aristotle raises but ultimately does not answer a puzzle
which purports to show that time does not exist. It takes the form of a dilemma, according to which,
since neither the past nor the future exist, and non-existents cannot be combined to make something
that does exist, time is not real. Nor can we reply that the present is a further part of time which does
exist, the puzzle continues, since the “now” is something point-like, insofar as it has no temporal
extension, and hence not really a part of time. This puzzle has noted similarities to arguments in Sextus
and in Augustine, but neither it nor Aristotle’s ultimate response, if he were to give one, have yet been
clarified as well as they might be. Some commentators have argued that the puzzle is a superficial one,
not worthy of explicit response; others have argued that it is a deep one and have offered solutions on
Aristotle’s behalf, though these largely involve offering Aristotle concepts which he does not develop in
his discussion, such as that of a “tenseless” notion of existence. I argue first that the puzzle’s simplicity
masks an important ambiguity which turns on what we take the alleged parts of time to be, and which
has so far been largely ignored; as such, two versions of it may be formulated, one of which is stronger
and more interesting than the other. I then propose a solution to the stronger puzzle on Aristotle’s
behalf, one which makes better use of the resources he develops in his own account of time than is
usually done. Aristotle’s response to the stronger formulation of the puzzle reveals, in turn, the outline
of a more interesting theory of time than that with which he is usually credited.

Pavle Stojanovic, Johns Hopkins University,
pavle@jhu.edu
“Can non-unified objects be peculiarly qualified in Stoicism?”
The Stoics distinguished between objects that are unified in virtue of possessing a ‘tenor’ (hexis), and
non-unified objects, those that exist by contact (e.g. a ship) or by separation (e.g. an army) and do not
possess a hexis. Although our sources are not explicit about the Stoic position on this, it has been argued

Abstracts, SAGP/SSIPS 2012, Page 65 of 75

September 17, 2012

recently, for example by Eric Lewis, T.H. Irwin and Giorgio Armato, that the Stoics thought that nonunified objects cannot be proper individuals, i.e. cannot be peculiarly qualified.
In this paper, I will argue that accepting that things without hexis can be peculiarly qualified need not be
contradictory for the Stoics and that there is textual evidence that suggests that they indeed might have
held such a view.
First, I focus on Simplicius’ testimony that the Stoics thought that a non-unified object can be a qualified
thing (to poion). According to him, non-unified things can be kata diaphoran, i.e. differentiated according
to an intrinsic character, and not according to some external relation. Moreover, he reports that the
Stoics thought that non-unified objects can be qualified in the strictest of the three Stoic senses of the
word, the one according to which qualified things are those that are enduringly qualified.
Second, I analyze the suggestion of Simplicius (In Ar. Cat. 214,34) that the Stoics thought that certain
non-unified objects are qualified in virtue of the co-operation of their parts towards a single function.
This idea seems suggests that a non-unified object, e.g. a chorus, is qualified in virtue of the functional
organization of its parts (i.e. its members) due to which it sings in a particular way. I argue that this type
of functional organization of parts should be viewed as belonging to the third of the four Stoic
“categories”, ‘disposed in a certain way’ (pōs echon), and that there is nothing contradictory for the
Stoics in claiming that non-unified objects that possess this special kind of functional organization can be
ontologically unique, i.e. peculiarly qualified.
Finally, I address a potential problem that in a functionally organized non-unified object its parts would
have to stand in extrinsic relations, i.e. they would have properties that belong to the fourth Stoic
“category”, “disposed in relation to something else” (pros ti pōs echon), and that such extrinsic
properties are incapable of producing an object that is peculiarly qualified. I propose that the Stoics
might have replied by referring to their claim that the world as a whole, whose parts are relatively
disposed, i.e. pros ti pōs echon, nevertheless constitutes peculiarly qualified entity.

Paul Symington, Franciscan University of Steubenville,
psymington@franciscan.edu
“Aquinas on Modes of Being”
Scholars of Aquinas's Metaphysics have discussed in great detail terms such as actus essendi, ens
universale, esse, ens reale, etc.. However, scholars have not conducted much anaLysis of his use of
modus essendi, beyond merely using the phrase. This is surprising since this term appears exactly where
his anaLysis of core metaphysical concepts is most intense and in-depth. For example, he utilizes modus
essendi when identifying the nature of categories as well as discussing the modality of natures existing
inside and outside of the mind. Cribbing Augustine, in the Summa theologiae 2.1.49.2 co., Aquinas
defines ‘mode’ as that which a measure determines: wherefore it implies a certain determination
according to a certain measure. In this way, modes of being are the various ways in which being is able to
be “measured.” Another way to understand Aquinas’s notion of modes of being is that they are the ways
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that things (res) are found to exist. Furthermore, modes of being can be thought as semantic
determinations of essences, and really distinct from the latter. It is also important to point out that the
phrase modus essendi is used a great majority of times in Aquinas’s answers to objections (e.g., in his
Summa theologiae and in a variety of his Quaestiones disputatae) and rarely in the objections
themselves. In this way, Aquinas thought of the notion as a philosophical resource in addressing
metaphysical problems and articulating solutions. In this paper, I conduct a careful philosophical
examination of Aquinas's notion of modus essendi as he utilizes it throughout his corpus to the purpose
of identifying a unified and integrated account of the phrase. I shall then show how it fits with some of
Aquinas’s key metaphysical terms as well as amplifying our understanding of these terms in a broad
understanding of Aquinas’s metaphysics. Some of the valuable contributions that modes of being brings
to Aquinas’s metaphysics involves how the unity of the substance can be maintained given the
diversifying conditions that arise in the substance due to the actualization of accidental essences within
it. It is also important for understanding his analogy of being doctrine. Finally, I shall also address some
philosophical problems that arise from Aquinas’s notion of modes of being, including how it is possible
for one and the same essence to have more than one mode of being. This would seem to imply that a
mode of being—or the existence of a thing—has some essential content that is not included in the
essential content of the essence that can exist under distinct modes of being. Also, in his Metaphysical
Themes: 1274-1671, Robert Pasnau claims that the idea of an essence changing its modes of being is
audacious and beyond comprehension. He illustrates this with the following analogy: to say that an
essence can change its mode of being is like “an event’s [sic] existing as an object, or an abstract object’s
[sic] taking on a concrete mode of existence. [But]…[h]ow can we make any sense, for instance, of the
number nine’s existing concretely?” (Pasnau, p. 188).

Basant B Thapa, Kangwon National University,
tbasant@gmail.com
“The Buddhist way to happiness”
Happiness is sometimes a very difficult thing to possess. It’s difficult because we don’t always have a
good idea of what true happiness really is. We usually project our own ideas of what happiness is onto
our everyday existence, and then we try to make sure that our life meets those same criteria. We can
correctly say that happiness is truly universal: it’s a universal goal, while at the same time being a
universal mystery. We talk a lot about happiness, and yet our definitions of happiness are many and
varied.
In it's over 2500 year run, the Buddhist tradition has had a lot to say about happiness. What true
happiness is and what it isn’t from a Buddhist standpoint. A famous Buddhist saying goes, “Happiness is
that which can be borne with ease; suffering is that which cannot be borne with ease.” Unsatisfactory
state is the mental and spiritual breeding ground for all of those things which cannot be borne with ease.
True happiness can be broadly defined as a mind-state. In Buddhist views happiness and the path to get
that happiness are various ways with give up of Greed and desire, ignorance and delusion, Hatred and
destructive urge.
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Allison Thornton, Baylor University,
Allison_Thornton1@gmail.com
“Socrates' Profession of Ignorance and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion”
The tension between Socrates’s profession of ignorance on the one hand and his confidence in
expounding doctrines on the other is a current that runs through much of the Socratic dialogues. Many
scholars have sought solutions to this problem (hereafter: the problem of Socratic ignorance). One such
solution is Michael N. Forster’s Socrates-as-saint model, according to which Socrates makes a distinction
between knowledge and a certain sort of unknown but true belief, and maintains that the doctrines he
asserts fall only into the latter category. This solves the problem of Socratic ignorance because the truebut-unknown beliefs are supposed to be deliverances of divinity. As such, they fail to meet the high
standards necessary for counting as knowledge but are nevertheless certain enough to warrant
assertion. Another contemporary current meets this solution to the problem of Socratic ignorance,
namely the epistemological thesis that only knowledge warrants assertion. This popular thesis
intensifies the conflict between Socrates’s profession of ignorance and his assertions since according to
the knowledge norm of assertion, we represent ourselves as knowing propositions whenever we assert
them. Does Socrates affirm the knowledge norm of assertion, or does he deny it? In this paper, I’ll argue
that if the Socrates-as-saint model is to succeed, then we must understand Socrates (at least: Socrates as
Plato depicted him) as denying the knowledge norm of assertion. That is, we must understand Socrates
as denying a majority-held view in contemporary epistemology.

Lewis Trelawny-Cassity, Antioch College,
lcassity@antiochcollege.org
“Reflections on Water in Plato's Laws”
In this paper I will take up the role that the element of water plays in Plato’s Laws. While much of the
Athenian’s focus is on the practical role that water plays in the life and indeed existence of the polis, the
Athenian’s treatment of water in the Laws sheds important light on one of the major philosophical
themes of the text, the relationship between law (nomos) and nature (phusis).
The element water is treated under two paradigmatic conceptions in the Laws: the dangerous,
uncontrollable briny sea (3.704a-705b) and the rains from Zeus that can benefit the polis if properly
channeled (6.761a-c). The first conception of water assigns to the legislator the role of shipwright
(7.803a-b), whose goal is to construct a vessel of nomoi to withstand or escape the harshness of natural
necessity (anagke). The second conception of water assigns to the legislator the role of gardener, whose
goal is to provide living things with the appropriate environmental prerequisites necessary to their
flourishing.
The two aspects of water in the Laws provide us with a complicated view of the relationship of law to
the elements of nature, and it shows the various approaches that the legislator takes to organizing the
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elemental aspects of the world for the sake of the polis. Understanding the different aspects of water in
the Laws is therefore not only an important way of coming to grips with the imagery and historical
details of the text, but it also allows us to consider the specific ways in which the legislator of the Laws is
partly akin to the “craftsman” (demiourgos) of the Timaeus, as Morrow suggested (“The Demiurge in
Politics,”1954).
Franco Trivigno, Marquette University,
franco.trivigno@mu.edu
“Medicine, Rhetoric and the Soul in Plato’s Phaedrus”
In Plato’s Phaedrus, there is a preponderance of references to doctors, medicine, health and medication.
The presence of the medical theme should not be too surprising. After all, readers of Plato should be
accustomed to the idea of philosophy as a kind of medicine for the soul. However, in no other dialogue
is there such a prolific recurrence of medical references: [1] a doctor, Acumenus, provides a medical
justification for walking outside the city; [2] references to sickness pervades the non-lover’s
characterization of the lover; [3] medication, or pharmakon, is presented as, in some fundamental way
ambivalent—both lethal and therapeutic—especially in the section on writing; and, most importantly, [4]
Socrates employs the analogy of medicine in exploring what it would mean for rhetoric to be a techne,
i.e. for it to be philosophical. In this paper, I wish to explore the medical theme in order to ascertain
what implications the medical analogy has for our understanding of the aims, possibilities and scope of
philosophical rhetoric. A guiding question will be whether the account implies that philosophical
speeches may be, given certain conditions, poisonous for the soul, that is, lead it to vice.

Thomas Tuozzo, University of Kansas,
ttuozzo@ku.edu
“The Sisyphus Fragment and Critias’ Alleged Immoralism”
Critias, leader of the oligarchic regime of the Thirty at the end of the Peloponnesian War, was a
playwright, prose author, and writer of sympotic poetry. The most extensive fragment of his work (DK 88
B 25) is a speech delivered by the character Sisyphus, probably in a tragedy of the same name. This
speech contains an account of the origin of law and the belief in the gods from an original, Hobbesian
state of nature. Since ancient times this fragment has been taken as evidence of Critias’ atheism; in
modern times, it has also been thought to evince an immoralist doctrine of might-makes-right that
Critias’ later political activities put into practice. I argue against these views by reading this fragment
within the context of the other extant fragments of Critias’ writing. Critias has a nuanced view of the
relation of human culture, nature, and the gods. Law (nomos) is essential for the establishment of
societies where the naturally base may lead a peaceful life and where the naturally noble may cultivate
their excellence and receive the recognition that is their due. Law, though necessary, is insufficient, for
two reasons: (a) it does not prevent wrong-doing in the absence of witnesses, and (b) it is liable to be
twisted by clever, unscrupulous speakers (see B 22). It needs to be supplemented by belief in punishing
gods for the mediocre, and self-cultivation on the part of the noble. The former require external control,
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while the latter exemplify self-control. Austere self-control, and not self-indulgent hedonism as
represented by Plato’s Callicles, is the Critian ideal.

Chris Tweedt, Baylor University,
chris_tweedt@baylor.edu
“What's So Bad about a Disjunctive Definition?”
Socrates’ often rebuts his interlocutors’ first attempts at a definition, because instead of giving a type
they give an instance. For example, in the Euthyphro, Euthyphro says piety is “what I am doing now”
(5d). But sometimes Socrates’ interlocutors give more than an instance; they give a list of more specific
types. For example, Meno answers “What is virtue?” by giving several specific types of virtue (71e-72a).
Socrates usually does not offer counterexamples to these answers. Suppose Socrates couldn’t give a
counterexample to Meno’s list because every instance of, say, virtue is covered by one of the disjuncts
(types) in Meno’s list and no instance of non-virtue is covered. The list, then, is exclusive and exhaustive.
What’s so bad with taking this list to be a definition? If an exclusive and exhaustive list of specific types
or instances suffices for a definition, then if there are forms, possibly (at least some of) these forms are
wholly constituted by their instances. To Plato at least, there’s something bad about that, but exactly
what is bad about that is unclear. In this paper, I will give and respond to unsuccessful answers to the
question “What’s so bad about a disjunctive definition?”, then I will propose what I take to be a
successful answer to the question. I will argue that my answer is one Plato would have given, and, finally,
I will show how my answer to this question illuminates Socrates’ dialectical enterprise.

Suresh Vythylingam, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary,
forgivenandjustified@yahoo.com
“Aspects of the Metaphysics of Augustine”
This paper will analyze certain aspects of the metaphysics of Augustine. In ligt of this, some of
Augustine's interaction between philosophy and Christian doctrine will be highlighted.

Matthew Walker, Yale-NUS College,
mattwalker2000@gmail.com
“Aristotle on the Ease of Philosophy: Protrepticus VI, 40.15-41.2”
Aristotle’s Protrepticus was a popular work that sought to provide arguments to exhort its audience to
the pursuit of a certain kind of philosophical life, viz., a contemplative life. In this paper, I examine a
series of three Aristotelian arguments that respond to the worry that philosophical contemplation is
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somehow too difficult to be pursued or enjoyed with profit. On the contrary, these arguments propose,
such contemplation is actually easy.
At first blush, these arguments for the ease of philosophy are apt to strike contemporary readers as
rather flimsy. As I argue, however, these arguments are worth examining closely and taking seriously.
First, they contribute to a fuller understanding of Aristotle’s grounds for valuing the activity of
philosophical contemplation as highly as he does. Second, these arguments engage with a deep worry
that Aristotle’s audience, then as now, is likely to have concerning Aristotle’s claims for the supreme
happiness of the philosophical life. In this paper, then, I aim (i) to understand what these arguments are
saying and (ii) to evaluate these arguments in the light of the best objections that they face. Ultimately, I
contend, these arguments are stronger than they may initially appear.

Julie Ward, Loyola University,
jward9778@sbcglobal.net
“Aristotle on Theoria and Continuous Activities”
The well-known passage in EN X 7 where Aristotle identifies eudaimonia with theoria is comprised of a
series of sub-arguments concerning the nature of theoria itself. Following the familiar opening lines of X
7, we find: “if eudaimonia consists in activity according to virtue, it is reasonable it that it should be in
accordance with the highest virtue (krastiste), and this will be of the best part (tou aristou)” (1177a1314). Compressing the passage, Aristotle is after showing that since theoria is the highest single activity in
which we can engage, it should comprise the highest activity overall, namely, eudaimonia, or happiness.
His argument for the main conclusion rests in part on proving that theoria is the “most continuous”
(sunechestate) activity, a notion supported by his claim that “we are able to think more continuously
than perform any action” (1177a21-22). The claim we can engage in theoria more continuously than
perform other actions seems to be taken as meaning that we can engage in thinking for longer periods of
time. And yet suneches, typically translated as “continuous” here in relation to theoria, seems to imply
something else than temporal continuity. For suneches is a term typically applied to certain kinds of
quantities, like lines and planes (cf. Categories VI), that possess “a common limit” (koinos horos) at which
the parts join (cf. 4b24-26). We may also call this feature “density,” in the sense of having infinite
divisibility. So, for Aristotle any line segment is suneches, and as such, is infinitely divisible. But the
respect in which the term applies to theoria among other activities (energeiai) is not obvious and so
warrants examination.

Joanne Waugh, USF,
jwaugh@usf.edu
“Protagoras, Doxa and the Democratic Polis”
The fragmentary state of our evidence for the teaching of Protagoras makes it difficult to talk about him.
That the state of our evidence makes us turn to Plato’s fourth century composition, Protagoras, in the
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hope of learning about the fifth century sophist compounds the difficulty. Plato’s Sokratikoi Logoi, as
Aristotle reminds us, are a species of mimēsis, and as such, their theatricality (to use Ferrari’s gloss on
mimēsis) is at least as important as their fidelity to history. Indeed, as there was not yet a tradition of
ancient biography, their fidelity to history may not have been a consideration at all.
Plato’s Protagoras tends to be received by the modern reader just as Plato wanted it to be received by
his ancient audience: Protagoras is presenting an outlandish doctrine, “man is the measure of all
things.” But for Protagoras’ fifth century audience—and even for Plato’s fourth century audience—
Protagoras’ teaching may be seen as the culmination of a tradition of embracing doxa that begins as
early as Simonides. It is the city, Simonides says, that makes the man (polis andra didaskei). In the fifth
century doxa becomes the term par excellence for decision-making in the City. If Josiah Ober is correct
in claiming that “Athenian democracy operated on the basis of opinion, not truth,” and “neither the
possibility nor the normative desirability of apolitical forms of knowledge about society or its members
ever entered the ordinary Athenian’s head,” Protagoras’ teachings are not a large step for Athenians to
take. Although not himself an Athenian, Protagoras can claim to teach the Athenians how to be effective
in doxa.

Ryan West, Baylor University,
R_West@baylor.edu
“Is Plato’s Socrates a Proto-Jamesian?: The Will to Believe in the Phaedo”
In the Phaedo, Socrates offers multiple arguments for the immortality of the soul. Ultimately, though,
Socrates recognizes that these arguments do not allow him to insist that things are as he thinks. Still, he
recommends “risking belief” in the immortality of the soul. In this paper, I will argue that Socrates’ views
on this matter are very similar to William James’ position on the permissibility of belief that goes beyond
the evidence. The paper will have two sections. First, I will outline James’ position as presented in “The
Will to Believe.” On this view, belief is permitted, even in the absence of compelling argument, if the
belief in question is a genuine option for the believer–that is, if the belief is a live, forced, and
momentous option. Second, I will exposit Socrates’ views on the ethics of belief as found in the Phaedo.
By focusing attention on what Socrates and his interlocutors say about the effectiveness of his arguments
(e.g., in 63b-c, 70b, 84c, 85c-d, 107b, 108d), as well as Socrates’ recommendation regarding belief
(114d), I will show that Socrates thinks his arguments are inconclusive, but that they nonetheless have a
role in making it rational to believe in the immortality of the soul, and that in order to face death well
one must venture out beyond what the evidence proves and risk belief. In so doing, I will show that
Socrates’ ideas can be mapped onto James’, and that, though disagreeing on some matters, Socrates and
James are in substantial agreement on the most fundamental issues regarding the ethics of belief.

Michael Wiitala, University of Kentucky,
mwiitala@gmail.com
“The Five Greatest Kinds as Preconditions for Any True Logos”
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During the well known digression on non-being and falsehood in Plato’s Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger
identifies “five greatest kinds”: being, motion, rest, same, and different. There is, of course, considerable
disagreement among interpreters of Plato as to the significance and status of these five kinds. This
paper argues that the five greatest kinds are significant because they are the immediate preconditions of
any true statement (logos), and therefore the forms without which knowledge of and logos about
anything would be impossible.
During his discussion of the Friends of the Forms, the Stranger notes that we presuppose that knowledge
and logos are possible whenever we “make strong assertions about anything” (249c6-8). He also starts
to identify certain things that must be the case given that knowledge and true predication are possible,
beginning with rest and motion. In order for something to be a subject of predication, it must
participate in the form “rest.” While in order for one thing to be predicated of another, the latter must
participate in the form “motion.” This is perhaps most clearly exemplified through the practice of
bifurcatory division which the Stranger and Theaetetus employ throughout much of the dialogue. A
form qua subject of predication must remain at rest while its predicates move or change according to a
fixed order of priority and posteriority. The art of angling, for instance, remains at rest while its
predicates change: angling is an expertise, is a possession-taking expertise, is a kind of hunting, is a kind
of aquatic hunting, and so on (221a7-c3). Furthermore, true logos presupposes the form “being,” since
the verb “to be” (einai) is at least implicit in any statement. Likewise, the Stranger shows that whether
something is subject to negative or positive predication—i.e., the manner in which it participates in
“being” and “non-being”—is determined by the way in which it participates in the form “same” and the
form “different.” The five greatest kinds and their communion, I contend, are presupposed by any logos,
especially by the true legein entailed in knowledge.
The first part of the paper clarifies the meaning of each of the five greatest kinds. Then in the second
part, I show how any true statement presupposes the five kinds and their participation in one another.

SIRIN YILMAZ, VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY,
sirin.yilmaz@villanova.edu
“Establishing the Unity of Plato’s Phaedrus through Dialectic”
In the Phaedrus, Socrates argues that “every speech must be put together like a living creature” (264c3).
Such a speech “must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole
work” (264c5), so that it constitutes a complete unity. In reading the Phaedrus through the lens of the
discussion of dialectic, this is probably one of the most important passages in the dialogue. In what
sense, then, the Phaedrus itself could be conceived as constituting a unity? Does the
as a whole succumb to the same problem it criticizes? In what way can this dialogue be genuinely
considered to be constructed like a living creature? At first, in the Phaedrus there seems to be two
separate parts, each with its own subject matter. In the first part of the dialogue, the subject matter is
love and there are three different discourses on love. In the second part, the subject matter of the
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dialogue shifts to the discussion of what makes a discourse appropriate to inquire into the nature of a
philosophical matter. There is also a contrast between dialectic and rhetoric, and through this contrast
the question of techné is introduced as an issue as well.
Plato’s Phaedrus is incredibly rich in terms of its content and this richness could also make it harder to
conceive the parts of dialogue as constituting a unified whole. Love is certainly one of the most
important themes; however, it is not the main focus in the second part. Not only the tone and form of
the dialogue change, but also the focus is turned toward more technical matters. In the first part, there is
a presentation of a written speech delivered by Phaedrus and two oral speeches offered by Socrates,
while in the second part there is a critique of both written and oral forms of speech by appealing to the
speeches provided in the first part of the dialogue.
What is introduced in the first part constitutes a preparation for and the background of the discussion in
the second part. When the dialogue is considered as a whole, its profound concern seems to be about
what the proper method is and how pursuing truth philosophically becomes possible. This method is
certainly dialectic, and the Phaedrus presents dialectic as the best available method for a philosophical
inquiry. In the dialogue, there is a movement from a least to most dialectical level, and this also works
toward the unity of the Phaedrus.
By looking at the Phaedrus as a whole, together with a consideration of Plato’s Seventh Letter, I will
strengthen my position in establishing the unity of the Phaedrus through the theme of dialectic, and I
will argue that the point Plato aims to make about philosophical inquiry in the Phaedrus is in line with
what he acknowledges about the nature of philosophical activity in the Seventh Letter as well as in many
other dialogues.

Pete Younger, Baylor University,
pete_younger@baylor.edu
“A Platonic Assessment of Socrates’ Philosophical Legacy”
In the Phaedo, we see Socrates interacting with his philosophical legacy, that is, a group of philosophical
figures deeply influenced by Socrates life and teachings. I argue that through his choices of characters to
include and exclude, Plato gives us a slim glimpse into his own appraisals of the diverse philosophical
legacy that Socrates leaves behind. On this reading, I argue that Plato’s view of Socrates’ legacy is
accepting of several responses, though not of all responses to Socrates. Plato sees his own response to
Socrates as one of many valid responses, but he specifically condemns the response of Aristippus.
I then consider why Plato might reject Aristippus’ response to Socrates’ life and teachings. I suggest four
likely reasons. By comparing the information we have about Aristippus’ life with others whom Plato
does not reject in this same fashion, I eliminate all of these options except one. The remaining open
hypothesis is that Plato rejects Aristippus’ response to Socrates’ life and teachings because of Aristippus’
hedonism.

Abstracts, SAGP/SSIPS 2012, Page 74 of 75

September 17, 2012

Brandon Zimmerman, The Catholic University of America,
66zimmerman@cardinalmail.cua.edu
“Plotinus' Arguments Against Pantheism”
There is an old suspicion, especially among some twentieth century Christian scholars, that there is
something pantheistic about Plotinus’ metaphysics. Plotinus is said to confuse the ‘being’ of the One
(insofar as the One can be said to have being) with the being of what comes from the One, or, in other
words, the One is in some way a part of what it makes.
However, Plotinus expressly denies such a position throughout his corpus and even argues that such
confusion of the One with what comes from it is metaphysically impossible. This paper will review and
explain these arguments in order to show that the transcendence of the One makes pantheistic
interpretations of Plotinus untenable. Furthermore, Plotinus’ arguments against pantheism are
consistent with his own negative theology; because the One is not a part of any finite being, our words
and concepts cannot adequately express it.
This paper will conclude by connecting a clearer understanding of the One’s transcendence to the issues
of tolma and plenitude in Plotinus. Some scholars have explained tolma as a necessary check on the
return of all things to the One so that all is not dissolved back into its source. On the contrary, the
transcendence of the One enables it to be intimately present to all things, and for the highest parts of
reality to be intimately present to it, without any possibility of dissolution. On the other hand, Plotinus’
apparent endorsement of the ‘principle of plenitude’ may be inconsistent with his understanding of the
One's transcendence, for how could a finite order of being ever definitively express the infinity of the
One?

Coleen Zoller, Susquehanna University,
zoller@susqu.edu
“Exercising One’s Whole Soul in the First City of Plato’s Republic”
In the Republic, Plato has Socrates describe a city where the citizens are healthy and peace prevails. Is
this “healthy,” “true city” (372e) (what Aristotle calls the “First City” ) as ideal as Socrates claims? Is it an
impossible fantasy? Scholars have considered the First City to be naïve and unrealistic, but, as Rachel
Barney has noted, both those criticisms could also be made of the Kallipolis. In her view, the First City is
“a strictly impossible city” because the rational and spirited aspects of the soul do not operate in the
First City. In this paper, I will challenge Barney’s claims that in the First City there is no political activity
and no exercise of the rational or spirited aspects of the soul.
While Barney is correct that daily life in the First City does not involve philosopher-rulers or the military,
I disagree with her assumptions that there is no political activity happening there. It is unfair to claim
that the First City lacks political activity just because there is no mention of a constitution or rulers. The
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citizens of this city come together because survival is considerably easier when they try to survive
cooperatively (R. 369b-c). Their political activity at the very least consists in their cooperative effort to
secure what is required for survival.
However, with respect to rationality and spirit, Plato does not go out of his way to clarify their status in
the First City, but he has Socrates make a very important comment about how those citizens “enjoy sex
with one another but bear no more children than their resources allow, lest they fall into either poverty
or war” (ouch huper tên ousian poioumenoi tous paidas eulaboumenoi penian ê polemon) (372b-c). This
brief but important comment insinuates that the citizens are doing more than just exercising the
appetitive aspect of their souls. It is evident that they are thinking about the consequences of their
actions. They are acting like people who have contemplated the ways poverty and war threaten health
and survival. Their behavior demonstrates rational caution (eulabeia). This contradicts Barney’s
assertion that in the First City “only appetitive motivations have any power.”
The account of the First City emphasizes that justice is manifest when everyone is provided for. Decisions
such as how many children to bear have a tremendous impact on whether and how one’s needs can be
met. If the citizens of the First City are cautious to avoid having too many children because they have
employed rational thought, then it is likely that their spirited aspect would be active as well. Plato
indicates that the function of the spirited aspect of the soul is to get angry when confronted by injustice
(R. 439e, 440c-d) and that the spirited aspect is the natural ally of the rational aspect (R. 440b, 440d-e).
So, given that the spirited aspect of the soul recoils from injustice, it seems likely that the spirited aspect
would be involved in the citizens avoiding poverty and war by choosing not to bear too many children.
Thus, our rational and spirited capacities appear to have a role even in the First City.

